Question: . Consider a collective action game where P(n) = n, S(n) = 3n + 4, N = 100. (a) Find the Nash equilibrium. (b) Compare

. Consider a collective action game where

P(n) = n, S(n) = 3n + 4, N = 100.

(a) Find the Nash equilibrium.

(b) Compare the payoff players get in equilibrium with the payoff they would get if they all chose P.

(c) What is the social-welfare function for this particular game? What value of n maximizes the function. Why is the maximum not n = 100?

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