Question: Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q1 - 2Q2, where Q1 and Q2 are quantities produced by

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q1 - 2Q2, where Q1 and Q2 are quantities produced by firms 1 and 2, respectively. The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MCi(Qi) = 2Qi, where i is either firm 1 or firm 2. Based on this information, firm 1 and 2's marginal revenue functions are

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