Consider a game between two generals 1 and 2, and two battlefields A and B. The generals simultaneously decide how many of their armier to put on battlefield A and how many to battlefield B. If a general puts more armies on a battlefield than the other general, he wins that battlefield and scores 1 point (while the other general gets nothing for that battlefield). If the number of armies on a battlefield are the same, the battle is a tie and both generals get 0.5 points. So for example if general 1 wins battlefield A and the outcome is a tie on battlefield B then general 1 ends up with 1.5 points and general 2 with 0.5 points. An army cannot be split, so generals have to place a nonnegative integer number of armies on both battlefields. (a) First consider the complete information game in which general 1 has 3 armies and general 2 has two armies. What are the Nash equilibria of this game, on pure and mixed strategies