Consider a market with a demand curve given $($in inverse form$)$ by$()=801\mathrm{.}00$P$($Q$)=801\mathrm{.}00$Q$,$ where$$Q$$is total market output and$$P$$is the price of the good. Two firms compete in this market by simultaneously choosing prices$1$p$1$and$2$p$2,$ where the lower$-$priced firm captures the entire market $($and a tie splits the market $50/50).$

This is an example of

$$Choose one:A$.$Bertrand competition.B$.$Stackelberg competition.C$.$Cournot competition.D$.$perfect competition.

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Part $2(2$points$)$

See Hint

Now suppose the cost of production is constant at $$50\mathrm{.}00$ per unit $($and is the same for both firms$).$ If the two firms are maximizing profit, they will each set a price of$$$$$and the total amount of production will be$$units$.($Give all numerical answers to two decimal places.$)$