Consider a non-zero-sum game in which the payoff matrices A and B are As[0 001 B-[000] 1 0 A=1001|, B=1100 0 1 0 Note that the diagonal elements are 0 in both matrices A and B. Player I's action set is (T, M, D) and Player 2's action set is (L, M2. R Part (a) Simulate the fictitious play in MATLAB and show that the fictitious play goes into a cycle. In particular, the players never play (T, L). (M,M2), and (D, R) Part (b) Now, change the diagonal terms in both matrices from 0 to 1/2 (let's call it and B). What is the matrix A+B now? Is it strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game? Part (c) Simulate the fictitious play for the game (m, n, A, B) and show that it converges to the Nash equilibrium Consider a non-zero-sum game in which the payoff matrices A and B are As[0 001 B-[000] 1 0 A=1001|, B=1100 0 1 0 Note that the diagonal elements are 0 in both matrices A and B. Player I's action set is (T, M, D) and Player 2's action set is (L, M2. R Part (a) Simulate the fictitious play in MATLAB and show that the fictitious play goes into a cycle. In particular, the players never play (T, L). (M,M2), and (D, R) Part (b) Now, change the diagonal terms in both matrices from 0 to 1/2 (let's call it and B). What is the matrix A+B now? Is it strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game? Part (c) Simulate the fictitious play for the game (m, n, A, B) and show that it converges to the Nash equilibrium