Consider a separating equilibrium in the signaling model where education is not productive. Q5.1 1 Point...

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Consider a separating equilibrium in the signaling model where education is not productive. Q5.1 1 Point The Type L workers get the efficient amount of education. O True O False Save Answer Q5.2 1 Point The Type H workers get the efficient amount of education. O True O False Save Answer Q5.3 1 Point Relative to the symmetric information equilibrium, the Type L workers are worse-off (i.e., have lower utility) in the separating equilibrium. O True O False Save Answer Q5.4 1 Point Relative to the symmetric information equilibrium, the Type H workers are worse-off (i.e., have lower utility in the separating equilibrium. O True O False Save Answer Consider a separating equilibrium in the signaling model where education is not productive. Q5.1 1 Point The Type L workers get the efficient amount of education. O True O False Save Answer Q5.2 1 Point The Type H workers get the efficient amount of education. O True O False Save Answer Q5.3 1 Point Relative to the symmetric information equilibrium, the Type L workers are worse-off (i.e., have lower utility) in the separating equilibrium. O True O False Save Answer Q5.4 1 Point Relative to the symmetric information equilibrium, the Type H workers are worse-off (i.e., have lower utility in the separating equilibrium. O True O False Save Answer

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O Currect Andwer is false L type meuch educaion warkers wont have t... View the full answer