?? 4. Consider a variant on the Aghion and Tirole (1997) model. Poppy, the principal, and Aiden,

??

Transcribed Image Text:

4. Consider a variant on the Aghion and Tirole (1997) model. Poppy, the principal, and Aiden, the agent, together can decide on implementing a new project, but both are unsure of which project is good and which is really bad. Given this, if no one is informed they will not do any project and both parties get zero. Both Poppy and Aiden can, however, put effort into discovering a good project. Poppy can put in effort E; this costs her effort cost -E2, but it gives her a probability of being 2 informed of E. If Poppy gets her preferred project she will get a payoff of $1. For all other projects Poppy gets zero. Similarly, the agent Aiden can put in effort e at a cost 1 of e²; this gives Aiden a probability of being informed with probability e. If Aiden 2 gets his preferred project he gets $1. For all other projects he gets zero. Note also, that the probability that Poppy's preferred project is also Aiden's preferred project is a (this is the degree of congruence is a). It is also the case that a if Aiden chooses his preferred project that it will also be the preferred project of Poppy. (Note, in this question, we assume that a = ß from the standard model studied in class.) (a) Assume that Poppy has the legal right to decide (P-formal authority). If Poppy is uninformed she will ask the agent for a recommendation; if Aiden is informed he will recommend a project to implement. First consider the case when both Aiden and Poppy simultaneously choose their effort costs. Write out the utility or profit function for both Poppy and Aiden. Solve for the equilibrium level of E and e, and show that Poppy becomes perfectly informed (E = 1) and Aiden puts in zero effort in equilibrium (e = 0). Explain your result, possibly using a diagram of Poppy's marginal benefit and marginal cost curves. What is Poppy's expected profit? (b) Now consider the case when the agent Aiden has the formal decision making rights (Delegation or A-formal authority). In this case, if Aiden is informed he will ECOS3003 Problem set decide on the project if he is informed; if not he will ask Poppy for a recommendation. Again calculate the equilibrium levels of E and e. 3 of 4 (c) Consider now the case when Poppy can decide to implement a different timing sequence. Assume now that with sequential efforts first Aiden puts in effort e into finding a good project. If he is informed, Aiden implements the project he likes. If Aiden is uninformed he reveals this to Poppy, who can then decide on the level of her effort E. If Poppy is informed she then implements her preferred project. If she too is uninformed no project is implemented. Draw the extensive form of this game and calculate the effort level Poppy makes in the subgame when the Agent is uninformed. Now calculate the effort that Aiden puts in at the first stage of the game. Calculate the expected profit of Poppy in this 1 sequential game and show that it is equal to (1− a)a+=a. 4. Consider a variant on the Aghion and Tirole (1997) model. Poppy, the principal, and Aiden, the agent, together can decide on implementing a new project, but both are unsure of which project is good and which is really bad. Given this, if no one is informed they will not do any project and both parties get zero. Both Poppy and Aiden can, however, put effort into discovering a good project. Poppy can put in effort E; this costs her effort cost -E2, but it gives her a probability of being 2 informed of E. If Poppy gets her preferred project she will get a payoff of $1. For all other projects Poppy gets zero. Similarly, the agent Aiden can put in effort e at a cost 1 of e²; this gives Aiden a probability of being informed with probability e. If Aiden 2 gets his preferred project he gets $1. For all other projects he gets zero. Note also, that the probability that Poppy's preferred project is also Aiden's preferred project is a (this is the degree of congruence is a). It is also the case that a if Aiden chooses his preferred project that it will also be the preferred project of Poppy. (Note, in this question, we assume that a = ß from the standard model studied in class.) (a) Assume that Poppy has the legal right to decide (P-formal authority). If Poppy is uninformed she will ask the agent for a recommendation; if Aiden is informed he will recommend a project to implement. First consider the case when both Aiden and Poppy simultaneously choose their effort costs. Write out the utility or profit function for both Poppy and Aiden. Solve for the equilibrium level of E and e, and show that Poppy becomes perfectly informed (E = 1) and Aiden puts in zero effort in equilibrium (e = 0). Explain your result, possibly using a diagram of Poppy's marginal benefit and marginal cost curves. What is Poppy's expected profit? (b) Now consider the case when the agent Aiden has the formal decision making rights (Delegation or A-formal authority). In this case, if Aiden is informed he will ECOS3003 Problem set decide on the project if he is informed; if not he will ask Poppy for a recommendation. Again calculate the equilibrium levels of E and e. 3 of 4 (c) Consider now the case when Poppy can decide to implement a different timing sequence. Assume now that with sequential efforts first Aiden puts in effort e into finding a good project. If he is informed, Aiden implements the project he likes. If Aiden is uninformed he reveals this to Poppy, who can then decide on the level of her effort E. If Poppy is informed she then implements her preferred project. If she too is uninformed no project is implemented. Draw the extensive form of this game and calculate the effort level Poppy makes in the subgame when the Agent is uninformed. Now calculate the effort that Aiden puts in at the first stage of the game. Calculate the expected profit of Poppy in this 1 sequential game and show that it is equal to (1− a)a+=a.

Answer rating: 100% (QA)

a 1 UP EB 1EeB gPE UA Eb 1Eeb gAe Here E effort B pa... View the full answer