Consider the following game in strategic form. L C R U 3,3 0,0 20,1 D 0,0...

Transcribed Image Text:

Consider the following game in strategic form. L C R U 3,3 0,0 20,1 D 0,0 6,6 1,1 (a) Show that the correlated strategy p such that p(U, L) = 4/5 and p(D, C) = 1/5 is a correlated equilibrium with public communication. (b) Show that the correlated strategy p such that p(U, L) = ¹/2, p(U, C) = p(D, L) = 3/20 and p(D, C) = 1/5 is a correlated equilibrium with mediated communication. (c) Consider a correlated strategy p such that p(U, R) = 1/10. Show that p is not a correlated equilibrium with mediated communication. Consider the following game in strategic form. L C R U 3,3 0,0 20,1 D 0,0 6,6 1,1 (a) Show that the correlated strategy p such that p(U, L) = 4/5 and p(D, C) = 1/5 is a correlated equilibrium with public communication. (b) Show that the correlated strategy p such that p(U, L) = ¹/2, p(U, C) = p(D, L) = 3/20 and p(D, C) = 1/5 is a correlated equilibrium with mediated communication. (c) Consider a correlated strategy p such that p(U, R) = 1/10. Show that p is not a correlated equilibrium with mediated communication.

Answer rating: 100% (QA)

a Let p be the correlated strategy such that p U L 4 5 and p D C 5 We will show that p is a correlat... View the full answer