Consider the following normal form game.

Player 2

C D

Player1 C 6; 6 0; 8

D 0; 2 4; 0

The stage game G

a) Find all the Nash equilibria (NE) of the game G. (You only need to provide the NE

strategies, not the calculations or the payoffs)

b) Assume that the above stage game is played 30 times. After each round, players

observe the moves done by the other player. The total payos of the repeated game

are the sum of the payos obtained in each round. Find all the subgame perfect

Nash equilibrium of the repeated game.

c) Assume that the above stage game is played innitely many times. After each round,

players observe the moves done by the other player. The total payos of the repeated

game are the discounted (with discount factor ) sums of the payos obtained in

each round. Is there a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in which

(C;C) is played in every round? Provide the discount factor () that must hold

for the trigger strategy to be a NE of the repeated game and describe the trigger

strategy.