Consider the following normal form game. Player 2 D Player 1 C C 6,6 0,8 D...

 

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Consider the following normal form game. Player 2 D Player 1 C C 6,6 0,8 D 0,2 4,0 The stage game G a) Find the all the Nash equilibria of the game G. b) Assume that the above stage game is played 27 times. After each round, players observe the moves done by the other player. The total payoffs of the repeated game are the sum of the payoffs obtained in each round. Find all the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. c) Assume that the above stage game is played infinitely many times. After each round, players observed the moves done by the other player. The total payoffs of the repeated game are the discounted (with discount factor d) sums of the payoffs obtained in each round. Is there a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in which (C, C) is played in every round? Consider the following normal form game. Player 2 D Player 1 C C 6,6 0,8 D 0,2 4,0 The stage game G a) Find the all the Nash equilibria of the game G. b) Assume that the above stage game is played 27 times. After each round, players observe the moves done by the other player. The total payoffs of the repeated game are the sum of the payoffs obtained in each round. Find all the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. c) Assume that the above stage game is played infinitely many times. After each round, players observed the moves done by the other player. The total payoffs of the repeated game are the discounted (with discount factor d) sums of the payoffs obtained in each round. Is there a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in which (C, C) is played in every round?