Consider the following two player sequential game. Player 1 moves first and can choose either option Left or option Right. If he chooses option Left, then Player 2 moves. Player 2 can choose option A or option B. If player 2 chooses A, then the game ends and player 1 gets 340 whereas player 2 gets 114. If player 2 chooses B, then the game ends and both the players get 0. Conversely, in the first stage if player 1 chooses option Right, then it is again the turn for player 2. Player 2 can choose option A or option B. If Player 2 chooses option A, then the game ends and player 1 gets 400 whereas player 2 gets 150. Finally, if Player 2 chooses option B, then the game ends and player 1 gets 26 whereas player 2 gets 148.

a) What would it look like if expressing this as a normal form game and presenting in a table?

b) If finding all the pure strategy Nash equilibria, how to explain?

c) What would it look like if expressing this as an extensive form game and showing the sub-games?

d) What is the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium here?

e) Why is there a difference in the answers in (b) and (d)?

f) What do we think will happen when this game is played by human subjects in an experiment? How to explain our answer with the knowledge of behavioral game theory?