Consider the following variation to the Rock (R), Paper (P), Scissors (S) game: Suppose that the
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Question:
Consider the following variation to the Rock (R), Paper (P), Scissors (S) game:
• Suppose that the Player 1 (row player) has a single type, Normal.
• Player 2 (column player) has two types Normal and Simple.
• A player of Normal type plays this zero-sum game as we studied in class whereas a player of type Simple always play P.
• Player 2 knows whether he is Normal or Simple, but player 1does not.
a) Suppose player 2 is of type Normal with probability 1/3 and of type Simple with probability (2/3). Find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria.
b) Suppose player 2 is of type Normal with probability 2/3 and of type Simple with probability (1/3). Find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria.
Expert Answer:
Suppose Player 1 plays T with a probability p and Player 2 plays L with a prob... View the full answer
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