Consider the game below. Player 2 U D 1,2 0,-1 1,4 2,0 R 2,2 -4,3 L...

 

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Consider the game below. Player 2 U D 1,2 0,-1 1,4 2,0 R 2,2 -4,3 L Player 1 C la. Suppose Player 1's belief is 02 = (3,3). What is Player 1's expected payoff from s₁ L? (2.5 pts) = 1b. Suppose ₁ = (1) and ₂ = (3). What is u₁(01,02)? What is u2(02,01)? (7.5 pts) 1c. List the set of best responses for each player: BR, for i= {1,2} (7.5 pts) 1d. List all pure and/or mixed Nash Equilibria in this game. (7.5 pts) Consider the game below. Player 2 U D 1,2 0,-1 1,4 2,0 R 2,2 -4,3 L Player 1 C la. Suppose Player 1's belief is 02 = (3,3). What is Player 1's expected payoff from s₁ L? (2.5 pts) = 1b. Suppose ₁ = (1) and ₂ = (3). What is u₁(01,02)? What is u2(02,01)? (7.5 pts) 1c. List the set of best responses for each player: BR, for i= {1,2} (7.5 pts) 1d. List all pure and/or mixed Nash Equilibria in this game. (7.5 pts)

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