Question: Consider the private value auction model, with n bidders. Each bidder's value is drawn independently from U[0,100]. (a) Suppose the seller runs a second-price auction.
Consider the private value auction model, with n bidders. Each bidder's value is drawn independently from U[0,100].
(a) Suppose the seller runs a second-price auction. What is the expected selling price, and the expected valuation of the winning bidder?
(b) From an ex-ante perspective, that is, before the bidders have learned their private values, what is the expected payo of any given bidder?
(c) Suppose that there are a large number of potential entrants, but only some will decide to participate the auction. That is, each potential bidder decides invest an amount k = 5 to learns her value. Only after such investment, she observes how many other bidders entered (i.e., invested 5 and learned their values). A standard second-price auction follows. How many bidders will enter the auction? (Note: in equilibrium, each entrant will expect at least zero prot from entering, and each non-entrant expects a negative prot it were to enter.)
Step by Step Solution
There are 3 Steps involved in it
Get step-by-step solutions from verified subject matter experts
