Consider the simultaneous normal-form game between player 1 and player 2 below, where each player has three strategies. Note: The first element of each cell in the matrix below is the payoff of player 1. player 2 C R -10. -10 0, 10 10 , 20 player 1 M 10 , 0 -20 , -20 -5 , 15 B 20 , 10 15 , -5 -30 , -30 a. (3 points) Does any of the two players have a dominant strategy? Explain (in words) which is the dominant strategy and why or explain why there is no dominant strategy. b. (3 points) List any dominated strategies for each player. If there are any, explain (in words) how you know they are dominated strategies. c. (4 points) Find all Nash equilibria in this game. Explain how you find it/them