(a) Use the following payoff table and the concept of a Nash equilibrium to determine whether each party (corporations and standard setters) will play strong and not compromise with respect to a proposed accounting standard or will compromise to find a solution both parties can live with. In other words, identify the Nash equilibrium solution. Assume the game is non-cooperative. Payoffs are listed in the order (corporations, standard setter). (4 marks) (b) Does the Nash equilibrium change if the corporations' payoffs for playing strong are decreased by 5 no matter what the standard setter decides to do? Explain why they do or do not change. (3 marks) (c) This table is a model to predict how a change in accounting standards would be negotiated between corporations and standard setters. What actual event or events might cause corporations' payoffs to decrease as described in (b)? (3 marks) Corporations Compromise Play Strong Standard Setter Compromise 30,30 20,10 Play Strong 8,40 12,15