Could someone please help me with a step by step instructions on how to find pooling nash equilibriums? What makes the

Exercise 1. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information 0.. Consider the following Bayesian game. Nature chooses state t1 or t2 with probability 1/2 1/2, respectively. Then the Sender observes Nature's choice and chooses L or R. Finally, the Receiver, who did not observe Nature 's choice but did observe the action of the Sender, chooses u or d. Specify a pooling Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in which both Sender types play R: i. Calculate the (consistent) posterior beliefs of the Receiver after observing R. ii. Find the actions of the Receiver after observing R, and after observing L. Show that these actions are optimal. iii. Show that choosing R is optimal for both types of the Sender. i.v. Summarize the pooling equilibrium you have found above. (Hint: don't forget to specify the off- equilibrium path actions and beliefs: i.e. the Receiver's action and belief after observing L.)