Distant Shores has two dance studios, one owned by Ann and the other owned by Joel.

Suppose that Ann and Joel have two strategies: to collude, fix the monopoly price, and limit the number of dance lessons, or to break the collusion, cut the price, and produce more dance lessons.

The table gives the payoff matrix of economic profit $($in dollars$)$ for the game that Ann and Joel play.

Ann's strategies $($red squares$)$

$\backslash$table$[[$Joel$\text{'}$s strategies $($blue squares$),$Collude,Collude,Don't collude$],[,30\mathrm{.}00,,48\mathrm{.}00],[30\mathrm{.}00,,-15\mathrm{.}00,],[,-15\mathrm{.}00,,0],[$collude$,48\mathrm{.}00,,0,]]$

What is the Nash equilibrium if the game is played once?

Do the people of Distant Shores get the efficient quantity of dance lessons?

If this game is played just once, the Nash equilibrium is that $$

A$.$ both Ann and Joel break the collusion

B$.$ Ann breaks the collusion and Joel colludes

C$.$ both Ann and Joel collude

D$.$ Ann and Joel either collude or break the collusion but we don't know for sure

E$.$ Ann colludes and Joel breaks the collusion

The people of Distant Shores $$ the efficient quantity of dance lessons from Ann and Joel because they produce the same quantity as would be produced $$

A$.$ receive; in perfect competition

B$.$ do not receive; by a monopoly