EC 101.01-05 Problem Set Chapter 13 Fall 2023 Scenario: Consider a trust game between an employer and a worker. The employer will either trust or not trust the worker. If the employer trusts the worker, she will hire him and then the worker would either work faithfully for the employer, or shirk in his work. The diagram below shows their respective payoffs in different situations. Don't Trust Employer Worker's payoff $10 Employer's payoff = $10 Shirk Trust Worker Work Worker's payoff $30 Employer's payoff = $0 Worker's payoff $15 Employer's payoff = $15 1) Refer to the scenario above. The equilibrium of this game is A) when the employer doesn't trust the worker B) when the employer trusts the worker, and the worker works faithfully when the employer trusts the worker, and the worker shirks D) nonexistent QC a 5 S) te ch co iv