Ex. 3 Air Strike Army A has a single plane with which it can strike one...

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Ex. 3 Air Strike Army A has a single plane with which it can strike one of three possible targets. Army B has one anti-aircraft gun that can be assigned to one of the targets. The value of target k = {1, 2, 3} is Uk, where v > V2 > V3 > 0. Army A can destroy a target only if the target is undefended and A attacks it. Army A wishes to maximize the expected value of the damage and army B wishes to minimize it. Formulate the above situation as a strategic game and find its mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Ex. 3 Air Strike Army A has a single plane with which it can strike one of three possible targets. Army B has one anti-aircraft gun that can be assigned to one of the targets. The value of target k = {1, 2, 3} is Uk, where v > V2 > V3 > 0. Army A can destroy a target only if the target is undefended and A attacks it. Army A wishes to maximize the expected value of the damage and army B wishes to minimize it. Formulate the above situation as a strategic game and find its mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.