Question: Exercise 1. Let S ER, -- (1 :)--(1:) 9 and let G be the 2-person normal form game whose payoffs to the first player (choosing

 Exercise 1. Let S ER, -- (1 :)--(1:) 9 and let

Exercise 1. Let S ER, -- (1 :)--(1:) 9 and let G be the 2-person normal form game whose payoffs to the first player (choosing the row) and second player (choosing the column) are given by A and B, respectively. 1. What pure strategies survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and what are the mixed Nash equilibria of G if 8

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