Question: Exercise 2. [3 points] Consider the following perfect information game: L] Qo Qo (i) (1 point) Solve the game using backwards induction and write down
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Exercise 2. [3 points] Consider the following perfect information game: L] Qo Qo (i) (1 point) Solve the game using backwards induction and write down the behavioural strategy profile and the pure strategy profile (that conforms with backward induction) (i1) (0.5 points) Now consider the normal form representation of the game. Draw the payoff matrix with player 1 as the row player and player 2 as the column player. (i11) (0.5 points) State all Nash equilibria in pure strategies. (iv) (1 point) Are all Nash equilibria in (iil) admissible? Explain
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