Explain why price matching can be bad for consumers. 2 S C 1 S 8, 8 1,9 C 9, 1 0,0 5. Suppose two individuals played the game of chicken described above. However, instead of playing three periods, the individuals only play the game twice. Furthermore, the individuals can communicate in the sec- ond period and have a coin to use as a public randomization device. Player one decides to use the following strategy: choose S in the first period; in the second period, flip a coin an choose S if heads lands and C if tails lands if the first period history is (S,s). Otherwise, choose C. a) Show that in the second period it is optimal for player two to choose c if heads land and s if tails lands when the coin is flipped. Show it is optimal to choose s in the second period when c is chosen in the first period. b) Given the payoffs to the second period under both scenarios. If player two uses a similar strategy as player one, is this a subgame pefect equilibrium? (Since you already know the optimal path of play in the second period under each scenario, is it optimal for player two to choose c or s in the first period.)