Find and explain these things from this case: (write academically)

1. What is the issue or what is the court trying to find the defendant guilty or not guilty of?

2. What are the facts? (include summary, names of people/officers)

3. What did the court decide? (the holding and the rule)

4. What is the reasoning from the court for their decision?

5. What does this mean for the defendant?

Roper V. Simmons

Facts

At the age of 17, when he was still a junior in high school, Christopher Simmons, the respon- dent here, committed murder. About nine months later, after he had turned 18, he was tried and sentenced to death. There is little doubt that Simmons was the instigator of the crime. Before its commission Simmons said he wanted to murder someone. In chilling, callous terms he talked about his plan, discussing it for the most part with two friends, Charles Benjamin and John Tessmer, then aged 15 and 16 respectively. Simmons proposed to

commit burglary and murder by breaking and entering, tying up a victim, and throwing the victim off a bridge. Simmons assured his friends they could "get away with it" because they were minors.

The three met at about 2 a.m. on the night of the murder, but Tessmer left before the other two set out. (The state later charged Tessmer with conspiracy, but dropped the charge in exchange for his testimony against Simmons.) Simmons and Benjamin entered the home of the victim, Shirley Crook, after reaching through an open window and unlocking the back door. Simmons turned on a hallway light. Awakened, Mrs. Crook called out, "Who's there?" In response Simmons entered Mrs. Crook's bedroom, where he recognized her from a pre- vious car accident involving them both. Simmons later admitted this confirmed his resolve to murder her.

Using duct tape to cover her eyes and mouth and bind her hands, the two perpetrators put Mrs. Crook in her minivan and drove to a state park. They reinforced the bindings, cov- ered her head with a towel, and walked her to a railroad trestle spanning the Meramec River. There they tied her hands and feet together with electrical wire, wrapped her whole face in duct tape and threw her from the bridge, drowning her in the waters below.

By the afternoon of September 9, Steven Crook had returned home from an overnight trip, found his bedroom in disarray, and reported his wife missing. On the same afternoon fishermen recovered the victim's body from the river. Simmons, meanwhile, was bragging about the killing, telling friends he had killed a woman "because the bitch seen my face." The next day, after receiving information of Simmons' involvement, police arrested him at his high school and took him to the police station in Fenton, Missouri. They read him hisMirandarights. Simmons waived his right to an attorney and agreed to answer questions. After less than two hours of interrogation, Simmons confessed to the murder and agreed to perform a videotaped reenactment at the crime scene.

The state charged Simmons with burglary, kidnapping, stealing, and murder in the first degree. As Simmons was 17 at the time of the crime, he was outside the criminal jurisdiction of Missouri's juvenile court system. He was tried as an adult. At trial the state introduced Simmons' confession and the videotaped reenactment of the crime, along with testimony that Simmons discussed the crime in advance and bragged about it later. The defense called no witnesses in the guilt phase. The jury having returned a verdict of murder, the trial pro- ceeded to the penalty phase.

The state sought the death penalty. As aggravating factors, the state submitted that the murder was committed for the purpose of receiving money; was committed for the pur- pose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing lawful arrest of the defendant; and involved depravity of mind and was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman. The state called Shirley Crook's husband, daughter, and two sisters, who presented moving evidence of the devastation her death had brought to their lives.

In mitigation Simmons' attorneys first called an officer of the Missouri juvenile justice system, who testified that Simmons had no prior convictions and that no previous charges had been filed against him. Simmons' mother, father, two younger half brothers, a neighbor, and a friend took the stand to tell the jurors of the close relationships they had formed with Simmons and to plead for mercy on his behalf. Simmons' mother, in particular, testified to the responsibility Simmons demonstrated in taking care of his two younger half brothers and of his grandmother and to his capacity to show love for them.

During closing arguments, both the prosecutor and defense counsel addressed Simmons' age, which the trial judge had instructed the jurors they could consider as a miti- gating factor. Defense counsel reminded the jurors that juveniles of Simmons' age cannot

drink, serve on juries, or even see certain movies, because "the legislatures have wisely decided that individuals of a certain age aren't responsible enough." Defense counsel argued that Simmons' age should make "a huge difference to [the jurors] in deciding just exactly what sort of punishment to make." In rebuttal, the prosecutor gave the following response: "Age, he says. Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary? Doesn't that scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary."

The jury recommended the death penalty after finding the state had proved each of the three aggravating factors submitted to it. Accepting the jury's recommendation, the trial judge imposed the death penalty. . . . After these proceedings in Simmons' case had run their course, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a [person with intellectual disabilities].Atkinsv.Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Simmons filed a new petition for state postconviction relief, arguing that the reasoning ofAtkinsestablished that the Constitution prohibits the execution of a juvenile who was under 18 when the crime was committed. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed that "a national consensus has developed against the execution of juvenile offenders." . . . On this reasoning it set aside Simmons's death sentence and resentenced him to "life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the Governor."

Issue

The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The provision is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. As the court has explained, the Eighth Amendment guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions. The right flows from the basic "precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense." By protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.

. . . To implement this framework we have established the propriety and affirmed the necessity of referring to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual. . . . We now reconsider the issue . . . whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.

Reasoning

The evidence of national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles is similar, and in some respects parallel, to the evidenceAtkinsheld sufficient to demonstrate a national consensus against the death penalty for [individuals with intellectual disabilities]. WhenAtkinswas decided, 30 States prohibited the death penalty for [individuals with intellectual disabilities]. This number comprised 12 that had abandoned the death penalty altogether, and 18 that maintained it but excluded [individuals with intellectual disabilities] from its reach. By a similar calculation in this case, 30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty, compris- ing 12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach.Atkinsemphasized that even in the 20 States without formal prohibition, the practice of executing [individuals with intellectual disabilities] was infrequent. . . . In the present case, too, even in the 20 States without a formal prohibition on executing juveniles, the practice is infrequent. . . . Since

Stanford[v. Kentucky,492 U.S. 361 (1989)], six states have executed prisoners for crimes committed as juveniles. In the past 10 years, only three have done so: Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. In December 2003 the Governor of Kentucky decided to spare the life of Kevin Stanford, and commuted his sentence to one of life imprisonment without parole, with the declaration that "we ought not to be executing people who, legally, were children." . . . By this act the Governor ensured Kentucky would not add itself to the list of States that have executed juveniles within the last 10 years even by the execution of the very defendant whose death sentence the Court had upheld inStanford v. Kentucky.

There is, to be sure, at least one difference between the evidence of consensus inAtkinsand in this case. Impressive inAtkinswas the rate of abolition of the death penalty for [individuals with intellectual disabilities]. Sixteen States that permitted the execution of [individuals with intellectual disabilities] at the time ofPenry[v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), finding no national consensus against execution of mentally challenged individuals,] had prohibited the practice by the time we heardAtkins.By contrast, the rate of change in reducing the incidence of the juvenile death penalty, or in taking specific steps to abolish it, has been slower. Five States that allowed the juvenile death penalty at the time ofStanfordhave abandoned it in the intervening 15 yearsfour through legislative enactments and one through judicial decision.

Though less dramatic than the change fromPenrytoAtkins . . .we still consider the change fromStanfordto this case to be significant. As noted inAtkins, with respect to the States that had abandoned the death penalty for [individuals with intellectual disabilities] . . . "it is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change." In particular, we found it significant that, in the wake ofPenry, no state that had already prohibited the execution of [individuals with intellectual disabilities] had passed legislation to reinstate the penalty. The number of States that have abandoned capi- tal punishment for juvenile offenders sinceStanfordis smaller than the number of States that abandoned capital punishment for [individuals with intellectual disabilities] afterPenry; yet we think the same consistency of direction of change has been demonstrated. SinceStanford, no State that previously prohibited capital punishment for juveniles has reinstated it. This fact, coupled with the trend toward abolition of the juvenile death penalty, carries special force in light of the general popularity of anticrime legislation, and in light of the particular trend in recent years toward cracking down on juvenile crime in other respects. Any difference between this case andAtkinswith respect to the pace of abolition is thus counterbalanced by the consistent direction of the change.

The slower pace of abolition of the juvenile death penalty over the past 15 years, more- over, may have a simple explanation. When we heardPenry, only two death penalty states had already prohibited the execution of [individuals with intellectual disabilities]. When we heardStanford, by contrast, 12 death penalty States had already prohibited the execution of any juvenile under 18, and 15 had prohibited the execution of any juvenile under 17. If anything, this shows that the impropriety of executing juveniles between 16 and 18 years of age gained wide recognition earlier than the impropriety of executing [individuals with intel- lectual disabilities]. In the words of the Missouri Supreme Court: "It would be the ultimate in irony if the very fact that the inappropriateness of the death penalty for juveniles was broadly recognized sooner than it was recognized for [individuals with intellectual disabili- ties] were to become a reason to continue the execution of juveniles now that the execution of [individuals with intellectual disabilities] has been barred." . . . Congress considered the issue when enacting the Federal Death Penalty Act in 1994, and determined that the death penalty should not extend to juveniles. . . .

As inAtkins, the objective indicia of consensus in this casethe rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practiceprovide suf- ficient evidence that today our society views juveniles, in the wordsAtkinsused respecting [individuals with intellectual disabilities], as "categorically less culpable than the average criminal."

A majority of States have rejected the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offend- ers under 18, and we now hold this is required by the Eighth Amendment. . . . Capital punish- ment must be limited to those offenders who commit "a narrow category of the most serious crimes" and whose extreme culpability makes them "the most deserving of execution." This principle is implemented throughout the capital sentencing process. States must give nar- row and precise definition to the aggravating factors that can result in a capital sentence. In any capital case a defendant has wide latitude to raise as a mitigating factor "any aspect of [their] character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defen- dant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." There are a number of crimes that beyond question are severe in absolute terms, yet the death penalty may not be imposed for their commission. These rules vindicate the underlying principle that the death penalty is reserved for a narrow category of crimes and offenders. . . .

Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders. First, as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies . . . tend to confirm, "A lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the young. . . ." In recognition of the comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State pro- hibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent.

The second area of difference is that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure. ("Youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.") This is explained in part by the prevailing cir- cumstance that juveniles have less control, or less experience with control, over their own environment.

The third broad difference is that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.

These differences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders. The susceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means "their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult." Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean juve- niles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment. The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character. From a moral standpoint it would be mis- guided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed. Indeed, "the relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside." . . .

Once the diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the peno- logical justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults. We have held there are two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: "retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders." As for retribution, . . . [w]hether viewed as an attempt to express the community's moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult. Retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.

As for deterrence, it is unclear whether the death penalty has a significant or even mea- surable deterrent effect on juveniles. . . . Here . . . the absence of evidence of deterrent effect is of special concern because the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence. . . . To the extent the juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanc- tion, in particular for a young person.

. . . Certainly it can be argued, although we by no means concede the point, that a rare case might arise in which a juvenile offender has sufficient psychological maturity, and at the same time demonstrates sufficient depravity, to merit a sentence of death. . . . The dif- ferences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability. An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or coldblooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death. . . .

Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disap- pear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under eighteen have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach. . . .

Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty. This reality does not become controlling, for the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility. Yet . . . the laws of other countries and . . . international authorities are instructive in interpreting the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual pun- ishments." Respondent . . . does not contest, that only seven countries other than the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and China. Since then each of these countries has either abolished capital punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the prac- tice. In sum, it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty. . . .

Holding

The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed. The judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court setting aside the sentence of death imposed upon Christopher Simmons is affirmed.

Dissenting,O'Connor, J.

The Court's decision today establishes a categorical rule forbidding the execution of any offender for any crime committed before his 18th birthday, no matter how deliberate, wanton, or cruel the offense. . . . The rule decreed by the Court rests, ultimately, on its independent moral judgment that death is a disproportionately severe punishment for any 17-year-old offender. I do not subscribe to this judgment. Adolescents as a class are undoubtedly less mature, and therefore less culpable for their misconduct, than adults. But the Court has adduced no evidence impeaching the seemingly reasonable conclusion reached by many state legislatures: that at least some 17-year-old murderers are suffi- ciently mature to deserve the death penalty in an appropriate case. Nor has it been shown that capital sentencing juries are incapable of accurately assessing a youthful defendant's maturity or of giving due weight to the mitigating characteristics associated with youth.