Five commuters A, B, 0,0, E, must choose between their own car with a fixed travel cost, or the public bus, where the charge to each user decream with the number of users. Let (*4 denote the cost ,1 travel time of using his own car for commuter i e {A,B,C,D,E] and let 6,: = 1,03 = 3,cc = 5,121; = 7,471,; = 9. Regarding the bus, if 1 person uses it his east will be 10, if 2 people use it then each of them will have cost 8, if 3 people use it then each of them will have cost 6, if 4 people use it then each of them will have cost 4, while if all 5 people use it then each of them will have cost 2. lilaturally= each player wants to minimize his own cost. Is there an).r dominated strategy (ies) in this game? If yes, perform an iterated elimination of all dominated strategies. Explicitly mention the sequence in which the corresponding strategic} are eliminated and present the resulting game. Find (and clearly present) all pure Nash equilibria (NE) of the game. \"That is the Price of Stability of this game (assuming that the objective function is the total travel time)