Question: For Part B, please explain/show work for how you calculated the corresponding discount facors. Player 2 Left Right Top -2,0 Player 1 Bottom 10, 3

For Part B, please explain/show work for how you calculated the corresponding discount facors.

Player 2 Left Right Top -2,0 Player 1 Bottom 10, 3 o,o

Player 2 Left Right Top -2,0 Player 1 Bottom 10, 3 o,o (a) What is the unique pure Nash equilibrium of this game? Now suppose this game is infinitely repeated, where players discount their future payoffs using a discount factor < 1. (b) For what discount factors (5 < 1, is the following profile of strategies a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium ? Play (Top, Left) in period 1, Play (Top, Left) if (Top, Left) has always been played, Play (Bottom, Right) if anything other than (Top, Left) has ever been played. Hint: Notice that this is a Grim Trigger Strategy. However, unlike the previous problem, payoffs am not symmetric. Hence, you need to make sun that neither player has an incentive to deviate.

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