For Question $27$ and $28,$ consider the following scenario. Andy and Hank are two college roommates who both prefer a clean common space in their dorm room, but neither enjoys cleaning. The roommates must each make a decision to either "Clean" or "Don't Clean" the dorm room's common space. The payoff table for this situation is provided below, where the higher a player's payoff number, the better off that player is$.$ The payoffs in each cell are shown as "payoff for Andy, payoff for Hank."

Hank

$\backslash$table$[[,$Clean,Don't Clean$],[\backslash$table$[[$Clean$],[$Don$\text{'}$t Clean$]],75,55,20,95],[95,15,50,45]]$

For this "dorm room cleaning game," what is Andy's Dominant Strategy?

A$.$ "Don't Clean."

B$.$ "Clean."

C$.$ Andy has two dominant strategies, "Clean" and "Don't Clean," depending on the choice of Hank.

D$.$ Andy does not have a Dominant Strategy in this game.

At the Nash Equilibrium of the "dorm room cleaning game,"

A$.$ Both Andy and Hank choose "Clean."

B$.$ Both Andy and Hank choose "Don't Clean."

C$.$ Andy chooses "Clean" and Hank chooses "Don't Clean."

D$.$ Andy chooses "Don't Clean" and Hank chooses "Clean."