For this analysis, you will assume the role of Douglas Myers. Incorporate the following questions into your analysis:

1. What are your goals compared to your Chinese counterparts?
2. What type of conflict may arise from the negotiation?
3. How would you describe the relationship between yourself and your Chinese counterparts? How might the relationship between the United States and China help or hinder the negotiation?
4. Realizing that you are in a lower power position, what is your plan for the negotiation? (Outline your plan based on the 10 steps discussed in Lesson 6.)
5. What is your BATNA?
6. What are your interests (as opposed to your position)? What are the other party's interests?
7. What are options for mutual gain?
8. As part of your analysis, find at least three quality sources to cite which will help to strengthen your analysis.

 

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albeit much less, to revenue for FY1988. The total cost of the 1987-88 panda visit was about $7.5 million.)35 VIII. Negotiating the Pandas' Return: Multiple Stakeholders To negotiate a return of giant pandas, Myers realized that he would have to deal with sev eral stakeholders and interest groups-and not just those in China. In the U.S., there were government agencies and officials at municipal, state and federal levels. International NGOs devoted to nature conservation and animal rights included the AAZPA, WWF, and International Union for Conservation of Nature. These groups' interests, policies, and po- sitions could help or hinder Myers's efforts. One clear legal requirement in the U.S., which aligned with the CITES treaty, was that the ZSSD apply to the Fish and Wildlife Service for a permit to import giant pandas. To approve a permit, the Service set three conditions: no harm to the survival of the species in the wild, the capacity of the receiving institution to provide adequate care for the animal, and benefit to the species from importing the animal. An application for a permit could be opposed or supported by any group. The International Fund for Animal Welfare, for exam- ple, generally took a stand against putting giant pandas in zoos. Given the large number of American zoos interested in giant pandas, the Fish and Wildlife Service would likely limit the number of import permits. When the time came, Myers would have to make a strong case for the San Diego Zoo. IX. U.S.-China Relations When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, the U.S. Government chose not to officially recognize the Communist government. As the Vietnam War dragged on and the Cold War with the USSR hardened, U.S. President Richard Nixon saw a strategic advantage in developing a relationship with China. In mid-1971, at the invitation of Chairman Mao Zedong, the U.S. Table Tennis Team played exhibitions in China. (This was called "ping-pong diplomacy.") In early 1972, Nixon himself visited China and initi- ated an 8-year-long process that culminated in the establishment of formal, diplomatic re- lations. To mark that first visit, Mao gave Nixon a pair of giant pandas; Nixon reciprocated with a pair of musk-oxen. The relationship between the two countries improved through the 1970s and 1980s. After the death of Mao, "pragmatic" Deng Xiaoping took over. He spearheaded the mod- ernization of the economy and opened it for international trade. Deng visited the U.S. in 1979, and in 1984, President Reagan visited China. Although the status of Taiwan, among other issues, remained a source of tension, U.S.-China ties expanded. Cultural and scien- tific exchange agreements were reached in 1984. From 1980-88, bilateral trade (combined export value) rose nearly 70%.3 In February 1988, after 7 years as vice president of the U.S., George Bush was expected to run for President in the fall election. He had served as Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in China from 1974-75 (when there was no mission or ambassador). He retained ties with high-level Chinese officials that could facilitate Sino-American negotiations. X. How to N Myers had comr over "first" exhil to be more chall To prepare his i Americans' neg One of the (lao pengyou).. executives seek and become rec U.S. diplor Among those in The most fi tify foreign and obligat variety of s dependenc Former U.S. S ship makes it declare-usua beyond comp Other asp political scier the role of su perspectives, have a clear: mize media | China specia China trade: A numb were "tough gaged in "e plete. At th evolved. In executives' cultural fac American t XI. Myel As Myers: inquiry ab tainly was 8 panda visit was holders to deal with sev- U.S., there were als. International ZPA, WWF, and policies, and po- S treaty, was that giant pandas. To of the species in e for the animal, permit could be elfare, for exam- as, the Fish and the time came, vernment chose War dragged on saw a strategic e invitation of in China. (This China and initi- , diplomatic re- on reciprocated 70s and 1980s. aded the mod- ted the U.S. in Caiwan, among aral and scien- ade (combined rge Bush was ef of the U.S. bassador). He no-American Negotiating about Pandas for San Diego Zoo (A) X. How to Negotiate with the Chinese: American Perceptions Myers had communicated extensively with Chinese scientists and government officials over "first" exhibits of various animals, but he expected the negotiations now on his mind to be more challenging. He wanted pandas for a longer period than any arranged to date. To prepare his approach this time, he could consult a small but growing literature on Americans' negotiations with Chinese counterparts. One of the most common observations centered on the expression "friend of China" (lao pengyou). Americans believed that this status accorded favorable treatment. Many executives seeking business with China did their utmost to curry favor with the Chinese and become recognized as a "friend." U.S. diplomats had a different view of the Chinese government's sense of friendship. Among those involved in opening relations in the mid-1970s, Richard Solomon had written: The most fundamental characteristic of dealings with the Chinese is their attempt to iden- tify foreign officials who are sympathetic to their cause, to cultivate a sense of friendship and obligation in their official counterparts, and then to pursue their objectives through a variety of stratagems designed to manipulate feelings of friendship, obligation, guilt or dependence. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger cautioned, "The proclamation of friend- ship makes it that much more difficult to disagree on those issues which the Chinese declare usually at an early stage of a negotiation--as matters of principle and therefore beyond compromise. Other aspects of Chinese negotiating behavior observed by American diplomats and political scientists included Chinese wariness of foreigners, skill in casting foreigners in the role of supplicants, early moves to establish a favorable agenda, emphasis on historical perspectives, and uninterest in legal concepts. Solomon advised American negotiators to have a clear sense of their objectives, to present positions in a broad framework, to mini- mize media pressure, and to exercise patience." MIT Professor Lucian Pye, an eminent China specialist, reinforced these points in a Harvard Business Review article titled, "The China trade: making the deal." A number of American business executives concluded that their Chinese counterparts were "tough bargainers." The size of their negotiating teams was imposing, and they en- gaged in "endless bargaining" even reopening deals that Americans considered com- plete. At the same time, some aspects of Chinese international egotiating behavior evolved. In surveys conducted between the late 1970s and late 1980s, American and other executives' perceptions of the keys to success in negotiations in China shifted from "soft," cultural factors to "hard" elements such as budgetary allowances and China's need for American technology.40 XI. Myers's Plans As Myers sat back in his chair to digest this information, his phone rang. It was another inquiry about his plans for giant pandas. This call was from a ZSSD trustee, but she cer- tainly was not the only person in San Diego thinking about pandas. Bringing them back 649 albeit much less, to revenue for FY1988. The total cost of the 1987-88 panda visit was about $7.5 million.)35 VIII. Negotiating the Pandas' Return: Multiple Stakeholders To negotiate a return of giant pandas, Myers realized that he would have to deal with sev eral stakeholders and interest groups-and not just those in China. In the U.S., there were government agencies and officials at municipal, state and federal levels. International NGOs devoted to nature conservation and animal rights included the AAZPA, WWF, and International Union for Conservation of Nature. These groups' interests, policies, and po- sitions could help or hinder Myers's efforts. One clear legal requirement in the U.S., which aligned with the CITES treaty, was that the ZSSD apply to the Fish and Wildlife Service for a permit to import giant pandas. To approve a permit, the Service set three conditions: no harm to the survival of the species in the wild, the capacity of the receiving institution to provide adequate care for the animal, and benefit to the species from importing the animal. An application for a permit could be opposed or supported by any group. The International Fund for Animal Welfare, for exam- ple, generally took a stand against putting giant pandas in zoos. Given the large number of American zoos interested in giant pandas, the Fish and Wildlife Service would likely limit the number of import permits. When the time came, Myers would have to make a strong case for the San Diego Zoo. IX. U.S.-China Relations When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, the U.S. Government chose not to officially recognize the Communist government. As the Vietnam War dragged on and the Cold War with the USSR hardened, U.S. President Richard Nixon saw a strategic advantage in developing a relationship with China. In mid-1971, at the invitation of Chairman Mao Zedong, the U.S. Table Tennis Team played exhibitions in China. (This was called "ping-pong diplomacy.") In early 1972, Nixon himself visited China and initi- ated an 8-year-long process that culminated in the establishment of formal, diplomatic re- lations. To mark that first visit, Mao gave Nixon a pair of giant pandas; Nixon reciprocated with a pair of musk-oxen. The relationship between the two countries improved through the 1970s and 1980s. After the death of Mao, "pragmatic" Deng Xiaoping took over. He spearheaded the mod- ernization of the economy and opened it for international trade. Deng visited the U.S. in 1979, and in 1984, President Reagan visited China. Although the status of Taiwan, among other issues, remained a source of tension, U.S.-China ties expanded. Cultural and scien- tific exchange agreements were reached in 1984. From 1980-88, bilateral trade (combined export value) rose nearly 70%.3 In February 1988, after 7 years as vice president of the U.S., George Bush was expected to run for President in the fall election. He had served as Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in China from 1974-75 (when there was no mission or ambassador). He retained ties with high-level Chinese officials that could facilitate Sino-American negotiations. X. How to N Myers had comr over "first" exhil to be more chall To prepare his i Americans' neg One of the (lao pengyou).. executives seek and become rec U.S. diplor Among those in The most fi tify foreign and obligat variety of s dependenc Former U.S. S ship makes it declare-usua beyond comp Other asp political scier the role of su perspectives, have a clear: mize media | China specia China trade: A numb were "tough gaged in "e plete. At th evolved. In executives' cultural fac American t XI. Myel As Myers: inquiry ab tainly was 8 panda visit was holders to deal with sev- U.S., there were als. International ZPA, WWF, and policies, and po- S treaty, was that giant pandas. To of the species in e for the animal, permit could be elfare, for exam- as, the Fish and the time came, vernment chose War dragged on saw a strategic e invitation of in China. (This China and initi- , diplomatic re- on reciprocated 70s and 1980s. aded the mod- ted the U.S. in Caiwan, among aral and scien- ade (combined rge Bush was ef of the U.S. bassador). He no-American Negotiating about Pandas for San Diego Zoo (A) X. How to Negotiate with the Chinese: American Perceptions Myers had communicated extensively with Chinese scientists and government officials over "first" exhibits of various animals, but he expected the negotiations now on his mind to be more challenging. He wanted pandas for a longer period than any arranged to date. To prepare his approach this time, he could consult a small but growing literature on Americans' negotiations with Chinese counterparts. One of the most common observations centered on the expression "friend of China" (lao pengyou). Americans believed that this status accorded favorable treatment. Many executives seeking business with China did their utmost to curry favor with the Chinese and become recognized as a "friend." U.S. diplomats had a different view of the Chinese government's sense of friendship. Among those involved in opening relations in the mid-1970s, Richard Solomon had written: The most fundamental characteristic of dealings with the Chinese is their attempt to iden- tify foreign officials who are sympathetic to their cause, to cultivate a sense of friendship and obligation in their official counterparts, and then to pursue their objectives through a variety of stratagems designed to manipulate feelings of friendship, obligation, guilt or dependence. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger cautioned, "The proclamation of friend- ship makes it that much more difficult to disagree on those issues which the Chinese declare usually at an early stage of a negotiation--as matters of principle and therefore beyond compromise. Other aspects of Chinese negotiating behavior observed by American diplomats and political scientists included Chinese wariness of foreigners, skill in casting foreigners in the role of supplicants, early moves to establish a favorable agenda, emphasis on historical perspectives, and uninterest in legal concepts. Solomon advised American negotiators to have a clear sense of their objectives, to present positions in a broad framework, to mini- mize media pressure, and to exercise patience." MIT Professor Lucian Pye, an eminent China specialist, reinforced these points in a Harvard Business Review article titled, "The China trade: making the deal." A number of American business executives concluded that their Chinese counterparts were "tough bargainers." The size of their negotiating teams was imposing, and they en- gaged in "endless bargaining" even reopening deals that Americans considered com- plete. At the same time, some aspects of Chinese international egotiating behavior evolved. In surveys conducted between the late 1970s and late 1980s, American and other executives' perceptions of the keys to success in negotiations in China shifted from "soft," cultural factors to "hard" elements such as budgetary allowances and China's need for American technology.40 XI. Myers's Plans As Myers sat back in his chair to digest this information, his phone rang. It was another inquiry about his plans for giant pandas. This call was from a ZSSD trustee, but she cer- tainly was not the only person in San Diego thinking about pandas. Bringing them back 649