Game Theory

QUESTION 5 15 points Save Answer Given the following signaling game, complete the following blanks so that they represent a POOLING perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Nature Type & Type Prob = .5 Prob m .5 Sender Receiver Sender's strategy: If her type is s, then she chooses action If her type is t, then she chooses action Receiver's beliefs: If the action is x, then sender is of type s with probability 1/4. If the action is y, then sender is type t with probability Receiver's strategy: If the action is x, then choose action If the action is y, then choose action QUESTION 6 3 points Save Answer Consider the contribution game in which each player (1 and 2) may choose a costly action individually or jointly that contributes to the provision of a public good. The payoff for each player is -2 without the provision of the public good. The public good brings an increase in payoff of 6 for each player, and the total cost of providing the public good is 4. If one player contributes towards the provision of the public good, the player pays the total cost (4). If both players contribute towards the provision, each player pays 2. The payoff table in the following represents this simultaneous game. No Contribution Contribution No Contribution -2, -2 4, 0 Contribution 0, 4 2, 2 Can this game be characterized as a prisoner's dilemma, a battle-of-the-sexes game, or a game of chicken? If so, name it. If not, say NO