Game tree for a $2$ player sequential game. If P$1$ and P$2$ both pick up$,$ P$1$ gets $$25$ and P$2$ gets $$15.$ If P$1$ picks up and P$2$ picks down, P$1$ gets $$10$ and P$2$ gets $$10.$ If P$1$ picks down and P$2$ picks up$,$ P$1$ gets $$15$ and P$2$ gets $$5.$ If both pick down, P$1$ gets $$15$ and P$2$ gets $$25.$

In the game above, what is$/$are the EFFICIENT sub$-$game perfect Nash equilibrium?

$($up$,$up$)$

$($up$,$down$)$

$($down$,$ up$)$

$($down$,$ down$)$

No EFFICIENT equilibrium exists