Gray v$.$ Martino,

$91$ N$.$J$.$L$.462$

$($N$.$J$.$ Sup. Ct$.1918)$

MINTURN, J$.$ The plaintiff occupied the position of a special police officer, in Atlantic City, and

incidentally was identified with the work of the prosecutor of the pleas of the county. He possessed

knowledge concerning the theft of certain diamonds and jewelry from the possession of the defendant,

who had advertised a reward for the recovery of the property. In this situation he claims to have

entered into a verbal contract with defendant, whereby she agreed to pay him $$500$ if he could procure

for her the names and addresses of the thieves. As a result of his meditation with the police authorities

the diamonds and jewelry were recovered, and plaintiff brought this suit to recover the promised

reward. The District Court, sitting without a jury, awarded plaintiff a judgment for the amount of the

reward, and hence this appeal.

Various points are discussed in the briefs, but to us the dominant and conspicuous inquiry in the case is$,$

was the plaintiff, during the period of this transaction, a public officer, charged with the enforcement of

the law?

The testimony makes it manifest that he was a special police officer to some extent identified with the

work of the prosecutor's office, and that position, upon well$-$settled grounds of public policy, required

him to assist, at least, in the prosecution of offenders against the law. The services he rendered, in this

instance, must be presumed to have been rendered in pursuance of that public duty, and for its

performance he was not entitled to receive a special quid pro quo.

The cases on the subject are collected in a footnote to Somerset Bank v$.$ Edmund, $10$ Am$.$ & Eng. Ann.

Cas. $726$; $76$ Ohio St$.$ Rep. $396,$ the head$-$note to which reads: "Public policy and sound morals alike

forbid that a public officer should demand or receive for services performed by him in the discharge of

official duty any other or further remuneration or reward than that prescribed or allowed by law." This

rule of public policy has been relaxed only in those instances where the legislature for sufficient public

reason has seen fit by statute to extend the stimulus of a reward to the public without distinction, as in

the case of United States v$.$ Matthews, $173$ U$.$S$.381,$ where the attorney$-$general, under an act for "the

detection and prosecution of crimes against the United States," made a public offer of reward

sufficiently liberal and generic to comprehend the services of a federal deputy marshal. Exceptions of

that character upon familiar principles serve to emphasize the correctness of the rule, as one based

upon sound public policy.

The judgment below for that reason must be reversed.