Hello,, I need your support to solve below task:

-What are the characteristics of Nissans and more generally Japanese leadership style ? What might be some key decision biases at Nissan ?

-What are the characteristics of Carlos Ghosns leadership style ? What might be some of his main decision-making biases ?

-What de you think are some of key challenges as these styles meet each other ? And how can these challenges be addressed ?

CARLOS GHOSN: THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AUTOMOBILE LEGEND (A) Looking back at May 1999, Carlos Ghosn would have recalled the uncertainty surrounding those early days when he left Paris for Tokyo. He was Brazilian-Lebanese-French, a walking melting pot of cultures, an absolute foreigner to a culturally-homogenous Japanese society, and he was on a mission to rescue a near-bankrupt automobile manufacturer - Nissan. Ghosn weighed his chances of success at "fifty-fifty', while a critic from a competitor viewed it as sinking a US$5 billion investment in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.' Ghosn (pronounced as "goan"), a Brazilian educated in prestigious schools at Lebanon and France, started his career in 1978 at Michelin, the world's second-largest tyre producer. He quickly rose through the ranks to head Michelin's operations in Brazil at the age of 30. Within two years, he earned his stripes by tuning around the company's ailing finances from red to black. He then conquered his next challenge in North America by successfully overseeing Michelin's acquisition of the fourth-largest tyre company in the US, once again reversing losses into profitability By the mid-1990s, Ghosn had earned himself a stellar reputation. He was headhunted by Renault, the multinational automaker headquartered in France Renault was struggling with huge losses before Ghosn came up with an ambitious plan to reduce cost by 20 billion francs in three years. In just a year, the plan achieved astonishing results, as Renault regained profitability while Ghosn earned the nickname of "le cost killer Another corporate adventure had awaited Ghosn as Renault entered into an alliance with Nissan in 1999. Ghosn felt proud that he was able to revive the debt-ridden Japanese car manufacturer, and integrate Renault and Nissan despite the diverse cultural differences and distinct corporate identities. In 2016, Mitsubishi Motors Corporation joined the Renault-Nissan alliance, and Ghosn was appointed as the chair of the alliance's board. Speculations on the potential merger of the three automakers into a single company were rife, but by 2018, negotiations had come to a halt, leaving the alliance in status quo. Cosmopolitan Background Carlos Ghosn was born in Porto Velho, a north-western city in Brazil on March 9, 1954. He spent his early childhood in the cities of Porto Velho and Rio de Janeiro before leaving for Lebanon, his parent's ancestral homeland, at the age of six. At that tender young age, he had already developed a keen interest in cars and was reportedly able to differentiate models by the sound of their homs. In Beirut, Lebanon, he attended the prominent College Notre-Dame de Jamhour, a private Jesuit Catholic Secondary school, which had several notable alumni, including Lebanese presidents. At 17, he moved to Paris, where he studied in prestigious engineering schools - cole Polytechnique in 1974 and the cole des Mines de Paris in 1978. Both universities were top-notch French institutions famous for producing Nobel Prize winners and senior business executives of large corporations. Being Brazilian-bom, raised in Lebanon and educated in France, Ghosn acknowledged that he was different from others since young. In an interview with a US newspaper, he shared, Because you are different you try to integrate, and that pushes you to try to understand the environment in which you find yourself. Thar tends to develop one's ability to listen, to observe, to compare-qualities that are very useful in managing Having lived on four continents - North and South America, Europe and Asia, Ghosn could speak quite a few languages fluently - English, French, Portuguese Spanish, Arabic, as well as some Japanese. A Rising Michelin Star Michelin France: Rising through the Ranks On graduation, in 1978, Ghosn joined Michelin, the French tyre manufacturer, as a management trainee. Michelin, the world's second-largest tyre producer by revenue, was established in 1889. Headquartered in Clermont-Ferrand, France, Michelin had production facilities in major parts of the world. Within a couple of years, Ghosn had climbed the corporate ladder to leadership positions. In 1980, he was promoted to lead a production team, and in the following year, he became the general manager of a factory in Puy-en-Velay, in southern France. Two years later, he headed the company's research and development team. As a young leader, he knew the importance of fostering trusting relationships, especially with senior staff members, which was essential in working together to solve problems. When Ghosn was first offered the job at Michelin, he was told that he would begin with a training in France and leave for Rio de Janeiro when he was ready. The prospect of working in Rio excited him, as he had wanted to reconnect to his childhood in Brazil. In 1985, at 30, he could finally realise his dream of returning to Brazil, but with the challenging responsibility of leading the problem-ridden subsidiary as the Chief Operating Officer. Michelin Brazil: The Maiden Turnaround In Brazil, Michelin had four factories that employed over 5,000 workers to manufacture tyres for trucks, cars, motorcycles and scooters. When Ghosn arrived, the company was suffering from escalating losses. Brazil's economy had been severely ravaged by hyperinflation; the annual inflation rate was above 1000% and the real interest rate higher than 35%. In addition, state regulations were stifling Michelin, as financial controls were placed on price, imports and exports. To make matters worse, the management team at Michelin Brazil had been taking instructions from the French headquarters who had little understanding of the Brazilian situation. Adding to the company's woes were poor relations with the government and a three-week long strike by factory workers. Ghosn took charge of Michelin Brazil by first reassuring the headquarters in France that he would accept all responsibility for the local operations if they granted him more autonomy. He then reorganised the company's finances and corporate structure. First, he eliminated debt by cutting unnecessary investments, reducing inventories and selling dispensable assets. Second, he brought separate divisions that were previously operating in silos to work together. During the same period, the economy began to regain stability after the government put in place an economic recovery plan. In a mere two years, Ghoon managed to turn Michelin Brazil's accounting books from red to black By 1989, Brazil was Michelin's most profitable division in terms of the ratio of profit to total sales. Ghosn had successfully reversed the dismal fate of the ailing Brazilian company, and he was ready for more Michelin North America: Managing the Integration of Two Cultures In 1989, Ghosn was given a new mission at Michelin North America. The subsidiary was contributing to 40% of Michelin's global sales but had only a small 10% market share in the US, the world's leading automobile market. Considering its growth potential, Michelin North America's performance was at best mediocre. As part of its expansion plan, Michelin had acquired another tyre company, Uniroyal-Goodrich, the main supplier of General Motors, in the same year. The challenge for Ghosn was two-fold: first to manage the integration of two different cultures - the French (Michelin) and the Americans (Uniroyal-Goodrich), and second, multi-branding of the two companies. Ghosn employed the same management strategies he had learned in France and Brazil to the US. He assembled a cross-functional team comprising engineering, production, marketing and sales employees to solve problems collectively. Second, he instituted cross-manufacturing practices where factories made specific categories of products sold under different brands. In addition, downsizing was inevitable as a cost-cutting measure, and three factories in North America were shut down, to much dismay and criticism. In 1990, US was hit by an economic recession, which expanded to Europe. As a result, Michelin incurred a loss of US$1.8 billion for the period 1990-1993, but rebounded in 1995 and eventually tured in an excellence performance in 1996. Around the same time, Michelin underwent a reorganisation. Instead of separation by region, the new structure was organised according to product lines. At 42, Ghosn was in-charge of the division for passenger and van tyres - the most important product lines in Michelin's business. He was the number two man in Michelin. However, he would have known that reaching the summit was unlikely, as that position had always remained within the Michelin family. When a headhunter presented an opportunity for a second-in-command role with the possibility of ascension to the top executive position in the automobile industry, it was an offer that was difficult to refuse. And in 1996, Ghosa joined Renault as the executive vice president. Reversing a Downturn in Renault Renault's Troubles Renault was founded by Louis Renault and his brothers in France in 1898. After the end of World War II in 1945, Renault was nationalised by the French government, thus marking the beginning of state involvement in the multinational auto manufacturer. Renault was a leader in the European automobile market in the early 1980s but slipped into financial difficulties in 1984 after incurring a loss of 12.5 billion francs (US$207 million)", a record high for a French firm at that time." Fortunately, it received a bailout from the state to tide it over the crisis. However, the automotive industry was becoming increasingly competitive and to survive, Renault decided to expand overseas, outside of Europe. But its subsequent globalisation moves were met with much adversity. Breaking into the world's largest automobile market, the US, was every European automobile manufacturer's dream. Renault made an attempt by buying American Motors, the fourth- largest firm in the US, but was later hard pressed by financial losses to sell it to Chrysler in 1987. In 1993, Renault attempted to negotiate a merger with Volvo, the Swedish carmaker, which had a presence in the US, but again, the venture was in vain. The 20 Billion Plan to Turn Around Renault A year after Ghosn joined Renault, he launched the 20 Billion Plan. It had an ambitious goal to cut cost by 20 billion francs (US$3.5 billion) in only three years, by reducing 10,000 francs (US$1,700) in the production cost of each car. Steep cost reduction was thus a key component of the Plan and it was applied in all areas - factory manufacturing purchasing, R&D, IT and administrative expenses. Ghosn soon discovered that Renault's corporate culture, similar to Michelin's, was deeply entrenched in silo operations. Again, he implemented cross-functional teams, knocked down internal walls and brought people from different divisions to work together. Another surprise for Ghosn was Renault's focus on harmonious employer-employee relations at the expense of labour productivity and corporate profitability. The state-controlled company was under the obligation to provide employment to the French people and had a tradition of powerful worker unions. To drive employees' awareness of the importance of productivity, Ghosn benchmarked Renault's factories to the most productive plant in Europe, which was Nissan in Sunderland, UK However, the major episode at this time was the closure of Renault's Belgium factory in 1997, which employed about 3200 people, leading to labour strikes and political protests. It was then that Ghosn was given the nickname of 'le cost killer". In the years that followed (1997-99), Renault's finances gradually returned to glowing health, thereby proving the effectiveness of Ghoen's plan. A New Challenge The Renault-Nissan Alliance The Daimler-Chrysler merger in 1998 had created a shockwave in the auto-car industry. The cross- border merger resulting in US$155 billion of annual sales, a presence in 34 countries and 440,000 employees was the biggest ever at that time." The merger had inspired Renault's management to seek acquisitions as well. After a few eliminations, the final candidate came down to Nissan, which Ghosn had dealt with when he was with Michelin in North America Nissan was desperately pursuing capital injection as it ran the risk of insolvency and was in a bad financial shape after several years of deficit. In March 1999, the Renault-Nissan alliance was publicly unveiled. Renault purchased 36.8% of Nissan's shares for US$5 billion and formed an alliance with the latter, with each retaining its original brand and corporate identity. 14 Nissan Nissan Motor Co. Ltd was established in 1934, although the history of the company dated back to the 1910s when automobiles were first produced in Japan (Nissan, in Japanese, literally meant made- in-Japan). The first vehicle manufactured in the Yokohama plant was the Datsun passenger car. As early as the 1930s, Nissan was exporting Datsun to America and Asia. Nissan's glorious days were during the 1970s. At a time when Europeans dominated the luxury sports car market, the made-in-Japan Datsun 240Z managed to score a triumphant success, becoming one of the most sought-after models, particularly in the US. Due to its good engine performance, attractive styling, and affordability, more than a million 240Zs were sold globally. However, the product line was terminated in the mid-1990s as it became too expensive to manufacture, In its domestic market, Nissan was slightly behind Toyota, Japan's leading car brand in the 1980s, but its sales volume fell drastically to half of Toyota's by the end of the 1990s. For 27 consecutive years since the 1970s, Nissan's domestic market share was in decline. By 1999, Nissan was on the brink of collapse after having incurred a loss of US$6 billion (684 billion yen) and a debt of US$20 billion (2.1 trillion yen).' In May 1999, Ghosn was on his way to Nissan's headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. Ghosn reasoned, Nissan needed someone who didn't carry all the baggage of the company's history: he had to have a degree of credibility that would have been difficult for someone from the inside to achieve. Engineering Nissan's Comeback The dire situation at Nissan in 1999 left its management with little choice but to sell one-third of its stakes and reluctantly handover the ruins to a foreigner - Carlos Ghoen. In Japan, foreign top executives were rare, but Ghosn was a gem in the auto industry as he came across as a visionary leader with an impressive track record. The presidents of both Renault and Nissan, Louis Schweitzer and Yoshikazu Hanawa, had singled him out as the only candidate whom they believed could engineer Nissan's turnaround, just as he did with Renault a few years before. As news of his appointment as Nissan's new Chief Operating Officer splashed over the international media, many critics were sceptical . However, Nissan's domestic competitors (Toyota and Honda) did not even bat an eyelid, and according to Ghosn, It was as if a small mosquito had entered their domain. It's got an annoying buzz, but in the end a little bite is the worst it can manage." Diagnosis of the Ailing Nissan Ghosn, however, did not let his critics distract him. He passionately pursued his new challenge and worked hard in diagnosing the problems faced by Nissan. Nicknamed "7-11', his workdays would typically begin at dawn and end late into the evenings. In the four months following his arrival in Japan, Ghosn made numerous visits to factories, talked to scores of employees and held countless meetings with suppliers. He came to the conclusion that a radical surgery' was inevitable for Nissan, the patient who was suffering from multiple ailments'. Nissan's lack of vision and corporate strategy turned out to be the most disturbing issues for Ghosn. Employees were pulling in different directions instead of working towards a common goal. Additionally, the management did not appear motivated to pursue profits, and together with the reliance on cheap, readily available bank loans, Nissan was sinking deeper into debt. Ghosn found that as many as 39 out of 43 models were unprofitable, and among them, even the popular Nissan March model made a loss of 15% Nissan had long prided itself at the forefront of engineering and technology, and assumed consumers valued quality over design. For many years, the carmaker's formula was to reproduce the same models of unexciting, boxy-shaped cars without insights about customer preferences. Conversely, its competitor, Toyota, was most agile at the game of replicating successful car models launched by other car manufacturers through its quick production and worldwide sales launches, and equally swift withdrawal from the market if it failed. Like many Japanese companies, Nissan was deeply entrenched in its keiretsu business network, which spanned across nearly 1400 companies in the late 1990s. The keisetsu was a unique economic model where a cluster of companies from different industries was involved in a closely knitted, intricate web of business relationships and cross-holdings. Although often considered as a source of strategic advantage, the keiretsu actually had a crippling effect on Nissan, as it remained tightly bound to its suppliers and dealers even as their relationships were no longer commercially beneficial.20 As for its suppliers, upon comparing the purchasing cost of parts paid by Renault and Nissan, Ghosn discovered the latter overpaid its suppliers by as much as 20-25%. Nissan was paying higher prices because, firstly, engineering specifications were not optimised to meet industry and customer requirements, and secondly, economies of scale were not realised due to a low volume of orders for each supplier within a large pool of providers. As purchasing constituted a significant 60% of Nissan's total expenditures, the over-payment stood out like a sore thumb.24 Similarly, Nissan was caught in the heiretsu web of excessive dealerships. Many of Nissan's 3000 dealerships were subsidiaries that were run by ex-employees who were not profit-driven. Strangely enough, they could not comprehend Nissan's strategies, and neither did Nissan understand their problems. Understanding Japanese cultural norms proved to be another challenge for Ghosn. He struggled with egalitarianism, a value that ran deeply in Japan, against his own management philosophy of efficiency and productivity. Ghosn observed, Japan's performance was a collective enterprise, no one should be abandoned on the side of the road." In Nissan, the notion of egalitarian equality had extended to lifetime employment and career advancement by seniority. One of the most notable corporate practices in Japan was lifetime employment - the recruitment of young graduates fresh out of school , and these "lifers' would continue to work in the same company until they reached the official retirement age. While Ghosn tolerated lifetime employment (he viewed it as a form of Nissan's loyalty to the employees), he nailed advancement by seniority as the culprit that led to a general work attitude of complacency and lacking a sense of urgency Although not distinctly Japanese, Nissan lifers were also found to be protective of their work territories and had the habit of attributing problems to others. Ghosn reckoned, "Admitting that things aren't going well is shameful. The Japanese have a reputation for never wanting to lose face".? Having diagnosed the ailments that plagued Nissan, what Ghosn did next was largely unexpected of a top executive from a Japanese corporation - admitting failure publicly at a news conference. A Bold Public Commitment: The Nissan Revival Plan In October 1999, at a press conference attended by many international joumalists, Ghosn announced the Nissan Revival Plan (NRP) - the proposed remedy for the ailing Nissan. Boldly making three commitments - a return to profitability in the fiscal year 2000, a profit margin of more than 4.5% of sales in 2002, and 50% reduction of net automotive debt - he declared that he would resign if he failed to achieve these goals.15 The announcement sent shockwaves across the international and local media, the automobile industry and even within Nissan Its impact had played right into the hands of Ghosn, who had two objectives in mind - one, to regain gradually Nissan's credibility by demonstrating transparency through open communication, and two, to instil a sense of seriousness and responsibility in employees towards achieving these commitments.26 Although Ghosn had openly acknowledged that Nissan was indeed in bad shape, all was not lost as the carmaker could continue to capitalise on its strengths - cutting-edge engineering, world-class production and a global presence. Holding onto that ray of hope, Nissan embarked on reforms throughout the organisation in 2000. Executing the Nissan Revival Plan Ghosn, well known for his self-discipline and decisiveness, moved quickly with the execution of the NRP. He reasoned, Five percent of the challenge is the strategy. Ninety-five percent is the execution. At the end of the day, the most disciplined organisation, the organisation which gives a lot of importance to processes, ends up prevailing." The key areas of his focus included cost reduction, corporate reorganisation, enhancing brand image (through launch of appealing automobile designs) and a refocus on international markets. Trimming the Fat in Purchasing, Dealerships and Manufacturing Capacity Staying true to his cost-cutting reputation, Ghosn's axe fell on several areas of expenditure across the company. He slashed purchasing costs by 20%, cut dealerships by 10%, and closed down five factories, eliminating 21,000 jobs. Such drastic measures were aimed at tackling the problem of excess, in terms of suppliers, dealers and factory capacity. By dismantling the keiretsu partnerships with suppliers and dealers, while maintaining investment holdings with those deemed profitable, he unravelled the traditional Japanese business culture at Nissan In order to raise the cost-effectiveness of purchasing further, he expanded the geographic scope of sourcing for parts from domestic and regional suppliers to a global scale. With cost-reduction in mind, the engineering and purchasing departments would relook into optimising specifications when negotiating with suppliers. At 50% utilisation rate, Nissan's factories were severely under-producing. Ghosn wanted to optimise manufacturing efficiency by raising the level to 75%. Five factories in Kyoto, Minato, Kurihama and Kyushu were shut down as a result, and 14% of Nissan's total workforce was shed through attrition, early retirement, conversion to part-timers and the sale of subsidiaries. ** Corporate Culture Reform Not only did Ghosn have to contend with the norms of the business culture in Japan (keiretsu, for example), he knew he had to reform Nissan's corporate culture in order to put the company back on track. He abolished the practice of staff promotion by seniority, and instead advocated the importance of work performance that contributed directly to the NRP goals. A portion of employees' remuneration in the form of variable bonus, which could constitute up to 40% of a manager's pay, was then linked to the company's performance. On top of bonuses, Nissan also issued stock options at a time when doing so was a relatively rare practice in the country. When it came to evaluating employees' work performance, Ghosn favoured transparency and objectivity, Employees were informed of the work evaluation criteria and the corresponding incentives of achieving the goals at the beginning of the fiscal year. The implementation of cross-functional teams to encourage greater teamwork was the beginning of a major restructuring. One of Ghosn's favourite management strategies, the institution of cross- functional teams, had proven to be an effective way to break down structural and hierarchical barriers, since the days he was with Michelin and Renault. In conceptualising the NRP, he set up nine cross- functional teams - 1) business development, 2) purchasing, 3) manufacturing and logistics, 4) research and development, 5) sales and marketing, 6 general and administrative services, 7) finance, 8) phasing out of product and services, and 9) organisation development."! Each team had two leaders and a senior manager, whom he personally selected. The leaders were executives from different domains, while the pilot role was filled by experienced senior managers who had the potential to become future leaders and were well respected by their subordinates. The leaders and manager would choose their team members. All in all, some 500 staff were involved in the cross- functional projects, with each team having around 10 members, along with sub-teams of about the same size. Another radical move that Ghosn made was to change Nissan's boardroom language from Japanese to English." Besides being careful not to show favouritism towards the French, his rationale of using a third language unfamiliar to the French executives from Renault and the senior Japanese managers from Nissan was that both sides would be compelled to be precise in their communication, Ghosn had designed the NRP specifically to address Nissan's pain points through reconstructing its corporate vision, emphasising profit-orientation and instilling a sense of urgency by setting deadlines, Performance targets were set for increase in market share, return to profitability and a customer satisfaction index. Internal reports on results were shared with employees monthly as part of performance monitoring Renewed Focus on Car Design In an attempt to inject new blood and infuse creativity into the design team, Ghosn hired an outsider as the new lead, much to the team's surprise. While it was the chief engineer who used to make design choices in the past, Ghosn took over as the final decision-maker in the selection of design models for new launches. Under the alliance, Nissan could tap on Renault's factories to manufacture selected models of Nissan's automobiles In 2002, a line-up of new models was launched successively. The redesigned Nissan March, an entry- level car targeted at the mass market, proved to be the most popular at a time when Japan was experiencing an economic downturn. By the end of the year, the new March was the third best-selling car in Japan." Nissan also introduced new models in other segments worldwide, such as the Moco mini-car, the Altima mid-size sedan, the X-Trail sports utility vehicle (SUV), the new Z sports car and the Infiniti luxury car. Nissan's Rapid Recovery Ahead of the original 2003 deadline, Ghosn announced the early conclusion of the NRP in February 2002. In just two years, his targets were not only fully met, they were surpassed. Nissan's operating profit for 2001 was US$3,678 million (489.2 billion yen), 68.5% higher than the preceding year, and the highest in the company's history. Its operating margin was at a record high of 7.9%, and far exceeded the initial goal (refer to Exhibit i for Nissan's performance for a five-year period from 1997 to 2001). Returning to top gear, Nissan had made a jubilant comeback. 2002 was the year that made Nissan proud and Ghosn famous. He was awarded the Japanese Prime Minister's commendation for business reformer as well as the Asia Businessman of the Year by Fortune magazine. 1536 In 2004, he was honoured with the Japan Medal with Blue Ribbon by the Japanese Emperor Akihito in recognition for his outstanding achievements. In the same year, he was added to the Automotive Hall of Fame as the industry leader of the year." In 2006, he was bestowed with yet another award an honorary knighthood from UK for his contribution towards strengthening ties between Britain and Japan." Inspired by Ghosn's success story, the Japanese published a manga (comic) book about his life story and restaurants sold bento (lunch boxes) with sushi (raw fish slices) arranged to resemble his face. The culturally-insulated Japanese had not only come to accept the gaijin (foreigner), they adored the charismatic corporate superhero to the extent of an almost cult-like following Looking back, Ghosn attributed the speedy turnaround of Nissan from the brink of bankruptcy to profitability to one of his characteristics - decisiveness. "We have minimised the time between the moment when the problem is identified and the moment when it is resolved", he said, adding that, "We went about our work very deliberately and very methodically, without making any compromises". A senior industry analyst, however, observed that being a gaijin, Ghosn was not culturally confined by Japanese practices and was therefore able to carry out unpalatable reform, something that a Japanese could not do. Changing Gears towards Growth After cementing his reputation as the saviour of the near-bankrupt Nissan, Ghosn's subsequent plans were focused on growth. In the three-year Nissan 180 plan, his target was set at one million units increase in worldwide sales, 8% or more operating margin and zero interest-bearing debt by the year 2005.40 Nissan executed the new plan extremely well and grew its operating profit margin further from 10.8% in 2003 to 11.1% in 2004. The stock market responded equally well and its share price rose three- fold, up from 410 yen (US$3.82)" in 2000 to around 1,200 yen (US$11.20) in 2001.43 Upon recovery, Nissan was ready to expand its global presence. Under Ghosn's leadership, Nissan began operations in India in 2005, Middle East in 2008 and Mexico in 2013. In an overhaul of Japanese auto manufacturers' old way of interationalisation: 'made-in-Japan, sold overseas', Nissan inaugurated new manufacturing plants in Russia and Vietnam in 2009, and grew its production capacity In 2010, Nissan unveiled the first mass-produced electric vehicle in the world - the Nissan Leaf, a 100%-electric and zero emission car." As at 2018, Leaf was one of the top-selling electric vehicle models, with 370,000 units sold worldwide." Leaf also won several international and domestic awards, among which were the 2010 Green Car Vision Award and 2011 World Car of the Year. The debut and success of Leaf signified Nissan's comeback as an industry pioneer in engineering innovation. Ghosn, the Auto Titan Meanwhile, Ghosn continued to bag awards, adding to a litany of accolades. In 2010, he was given the title of "Most Respected CEO:' by CEO Quarterly Magazine, and in 2011, he was named "Asia Business Leader of the Year' by CNBC.4447 in 2012, he received the Japan Society Award, given by the Japan Society, a non-profit organisation to outstanding individuals with significant contributions to Japan's business, culture or society. As the corporate superhero who rescued Japan's number two car manufacturer from the brink of collapse, Ghosn was the highest-paid automaker executive as of 2011. Still the top earner in 2014, his income was four times more than that of the President of Toyota Motor Corp., although Nissan's profits was only one-fifth of the latter's. Separately, Nissan had proportioned a reserved budget at Ghosn's disposal for purposes related to "CEO matters'. In a row starting in 2014, Ghosn's huge paycheck attracted the French government's attention and became the subject of controversy for five years. His earnings of US$8.17 million had first raised eyebrows of Renault's board members, as it was more than double that of the previous year. Firmly believing in performance-based recognition, Ghosn's often-espoused mantra was that "the highest achievers got the highest rewards" on whether he believed he was overpaid, Ghosn laughed as he said in an interview, You won't have any CEO say, I'm overly compensated"." Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance In 2016, Mitsubishi Motors Corporation joined the Renault-Nissan alliance. Mitsubishi had its automobile origins established in the 1910s by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, one of the largest private firms in Japan. Mitsubishi was struggling financially after admitting to the falsification of fuel-efficiency data." Two of Nissan's minicar models were manufactured by Mitsubishi at that time, and Nissan was implicated in the scandal that was estimated to cost both companies US$2.5 billion 270 billion yen)." Nissan eventually acquired a 34% stake in the struggling car maker and entered into a three- way alliance. Both Nissan and Mitsubishi could reap synergies from the alliance. The combined production capacity of the three-way behemoth (including Renault) would rival their biggest competitors, such as Toyota, Volkswagen and General Motors, which sold about 10 million vehicles each annually. In addition, Nissan could grow its small market share in Southeast Asia where Mitsubishi had a strong presence, while Mitsubishi planned to tap on Nissan's markets in the US for expansion. Ghosn was appointed as the chair of the alliance's board to oversee the restoration of Mitsubishi's reputation. In 2017, Ghosn stepped down as CEO of Nissan, but retained his chairmanship, in order to focus his work on turning around Mitsubishi and on the alliance as a whole. Towards the end of 2018, speculations that had commenced in 2015 on the potential merger of Renault and Nissan into a single company continued, but talks between the French and Japanese had stalled, leaving the alliance in status quo since then