Hello, please help to solve these questions

9. Suppose the shareholder(principal} hires the manager (agent), and del egate the management. The manager's utilit},r function is nf'w) = 1131'\" where to is the compensation for the manager, and w 2 0. The prob abilit},r of success for the manager depends on the effort level, e, of the manager. If the manager works hard, e = ea, the performance of the rm') will be Good(V = VH} with probabih'tj,r pH BadlfV = FL} with probabilityr 1 :15. If the manager is lazy, e = eg, the performance of the 1m(V) will be, Good(V = V3} with probabih'tj,r pg, Bade 2 FL) with probability 1 3);, Here we assume F}; :2 FL, and 1 > pH by; > I]. The effort costs to the manager of working hard is C ::- I], and of being lazyr is C\" = U. The outside option of the compensation [reservation compensation} for the manager is assumed to be :1. Assume that tag is the compensation for a manager when performance is good, and mg is the compensation for a manager when performance is bad. (a) When the effort level of the manager is observable (symmetric in formation). show the optimal combination of compensation {w&,w) offered by the shareholder. (b) When the effort level of the manager is unobservable (asymmet ric information), show the IC condition and optimal combination of compensation {105,133} oered by the shareholder