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Consider a single manufacturer that must sell its product through two retailers. The manufacturer can produce the product at a marginal cost of 20, while the retailer's......

Question 10 : 160 points Consider a single manufacturer that must sell its product through two etailers . The manufacturer can produce the product at a marginal cost of 20 , while the retaile he retailers marginal costs are only the wholesale cost w per unit of the product paid to the manufacture In stage one of this game , the manufacturer sets the wholesale price and in stage two the two retailers compete in Cournot competition by choosing quantities , 91 and 92 . Inverse demand for the product is P - 80 - where ! = 91 + 92 We are in ( a ) 10 points Suppose the manufacturer has chosen w already so we are in stage two of the game . Solve for the Cournot equilibrium . The answer should depend on w . What is total output sold in the marke ( b ) 20 points . Suppose the retailers compete for an infinite number of time periods and dis - count future profits by a discount factor of B . How large must be for the retailers to Hers to sustain collusion ? The answer should depend on w . What is total output sold in the ma ket each period ? You can assume w - 50 to simplify the calculation ( C ) 10 points ) Suppose B is not large enough to sustain collusion . What wholesale price w will the manufacturer choose ? ( d ) 10 points Suppose B is large enough to sustain collusion . What wholesale price to will the manufacturer choose ? ( @ ) ( 10 points Does the manufacturer prefer the retailers collude with each other or compete with each other ? Why