I do not know how to answer this question. I have been stuck on it for a while. Help very is appreciated.

3. Consider the following game between Honda and Toyota. Each rm is considering an expansion of its capacity. The following table shows the annual prot that each rm would earn at different capacities. Honda's prot is the rst entry in each cell; Toyota's prot is the second entry. Toyota No Expansion Small No Expansion 40, 18 28, 22 Honda Small Large a) Suppose two rms make their decisions about expansion simultaneously. Does either rm have a dominant strategy? If so, identify it. What is the purestrategy Nash equilibrium in this game? b) Suppose the game is played sequentially, with Honda moving rst and Toyota moving second. What is the equilibrium in this sequential game? Would Honda have a rst-mover advantage? If so, briey explain how. 0) Suppose you were hired to advise Toyota about its choice of capacity. If Toyota has the option of moving rst, should it do so? Explain