I need help with this question. This question has 2 parts to it. It's all using python.

Using the question above to do this one below.

The Birthday Paradox Attack a job at CSE in Ottawa. Every month CSE announces a list of 3 prime numbers (all less numbers, and that the attacker would have no need to break RSA at all. Johnny was than 2) in proxy repositories which automatically sign the 3 numbers for Navy Bases to speechless! In her explanation, Johnny's boss alluded to the birthday paradox, a concept fetch them. These numbers become part of public keys so confidentiality is not required, only signature. In his very first day at work, Johnny volunteers to take charge of the automatic signature generation in the Bay of Fundy proxy (as it was close enough to his native Saint John). He decided to sign the 3 numbers using a hash value consisting of the bitwise XOR amongst the bit representation of these 3 numbers and then encrypting the hash value using CSE's private RSA key. Further only signed the numbers if all of the 3 numbers were prime Le lfat least one of the 3 (c) Espain to Johnny that the attacker would replace the legitimate B un set numbers were composite the process would refuse to sign). . Johnny, a UOIT graduate recently got by computing the hashes of only 2a1-2"-16 (not l 28) sets of 3 random comnoste hat for some reason t Johnny never quite erasped while taking INFR3600 at UOIT. Help ohnny understand the birthday paradox, after the fact, by following these steps: ( hashes of 2- 16 sets of 3 random prime numhers less than 2 selecting sets of 3 fraudulentosite numbers less than 2 until you (a) Compute the ) Then keep ( find a set {c, c, c) with a hash value that matches one of the hashes computed in step (a), we will refer to that matching set as {pi, p2, p3} l ast month's numbers were [251, 157, 1911. Johnny's program computed the hash to be 217 (because 251 XOR 157 XOR 191-217) which then was encrypted with RSA and appended to the set of numbers as signature. Shortly after, CSE suspected a probable compromise of the Bay of Fundy proxy since the Nova Scotia Navy Base ended up using composite numbers in their crypto operations causing serious disruptions! During his debrief, Johnny claimed that to forge the signature with probability , an 157, 191} with the fraudulent co nposte set {C1, C2, C3} n the Bay of Fundy proxy server The attacker will then use Johnny's automatic signing process to sign the prime set {Pa, p, p:) and append such signature to the composite set (c, C. At this point the attacker has been successful at signing the composite set , c, c without knowing CSE's RSA privatc key and by computing just over 16 hashes (ie, 16 from Part (a) +some from Part (d) Submit a snapshot like the one depicted in the figure below attacker would need to compute the hash values o-128 sets of 3 random composite numbers, not to mention that the attacker would have required to break RSA Noes: Of couse Johay wasn't so nuive as suggest uch a sieple scheme osianng in realy he was uing SHA 256 bat here we ane simplifying things jet to get the ooncept across (see Question 4). Also, CSE use prime umbers in the oner of 2..ot 2K As pr Johnny's firture CSF, don't worry. his bos decided to give him a second chance olany wis spotled lasl evering ckose to the ByWad Market joying beaver al wih his partac advises that Johnny's claims were o optimistic saying that the attacker could forge a signature with probability greater than 149 103 167 looking for a fraudulent message that collision found after 3 attenots 1ches a ualid message's hash 103 167 221 ress any key to contirue The Birthday Paradox Attack a job at CSE in Ottawa. Every month CSE announces a list of 3 prime numbers (all less numbers, and that the attacker would have no need to break RSA at all. Johnny was than 2) in proxy repositories which automatically sign the 3 numbers for Navy Bases to speechless! In her explanation, Johnny's boss alluded to the birthday paradox, a concept fetch them. These numbers become part of public keys so confidentiality is not required, only signature. In his very first day at work, Johnny volunteers to take charge of the automatic signature generation in the Bay of Fundy proxy (as it was close enough to his native Saint John). He decided to sign the 3 numbers using a hash value consisting of the bitwise XOR amongst the bit representation of these 3 numbers and then encrypting the hash value using CSE's private RSA key. Further only signed the numbers if all of the 3 numbers were prime Le lfat least one of the 3 (c) Espain to Johnny that the attacker would replace the legitimate B un set numbers were composite the process would refuse to sign). . Johnny, a UOIT graduate recently got by computing the hashes of only 2a1-2"-16 (not l 28) sets of 3 random comnoste hat for some reason t Johnny never quite erasped while taking INFR3600 at UOIT. Help ohnny understand the birthday paradox, after the fact, by following these steps: ( hashes of 2- 16 sets of 3 random prime numhers less than 2 selecting sets of 3 fraudulentosite numbers less than 2 until you (a) Compute the ) Then keep ( find a set {c, c, c) with a hash value that matches one of the hashes computed in step (a), we will refer to that matching set as {pi, p2, p3} l ast month's numbers were [251, 157, 1911. Johnny's program computed the hash to be 217 (because 251 XOR 157 XOR 191-217) which then was encrypted with RSA and appended to the set of numbers as signature. Shortly after, CSE suspected a probable compromise of the Bay of Fundy proxy since the Nova Scotia Navy Base ended up using composite numbers in their crypto operations causing serious disruptions! During his debrief, Johnny claimed that to forge the signature with probability , an 157, 191} with the fraudulent co nposte set {C1, C2, C3} n the Bay of Fundy proxy server The attacker will then use Johnny's automatic signing process to sign the prime set {Pa, p, p:) and append such signature to the composite set (c, C. At this point the attacker has been successful at signing the composite set , c, c without knowing CSE's RSA privatc key and by computing just over 16 hashes (ie, 16 from Part (a) +some from Part (d) Submit a snapshot like the one depicted in the figure below attacker would need to compute the hash values o-128 sets of 3 random composite numbers, not to mention that the attacker would have required to break RSA Noes: Of couse Johay wasn't so nuive as suggest uch a sieple scheme osianng in realy he was uing SHA 256 bat here we ane simplifying things jet to get the ooncept across (see Question 4). Also, CSE use prime umbers in the oner of 2..ot 2K As pr Johnny's firture CSF, don't worry. his bos decided to give him a second chance olany wis spotled lasl evering ckose to the ByWad Market joying beaver al wih his partac advises that Johnny's claims were o optimistic saying that the attacker could forge a signature with probability greater than 149 103 167 looking for a fraudulent message that collision found after 3 attenots 1ches a ualid message's hash 103 167 221 ress any key to contirue