I need it Urgently in an hour.I shall be really grateful.Thanks

Question is complete.

As an analyst at the Competition Bureau, you are tasked to determine under what conditions a cartel would be sustained in a duopoly industry. Each firm could produce two levels of output, = 15 and 91 = 20, for i = (1,2). The payoffs, representing each firm's profit, for each of the two firms are reported in Table 1 as a function of the constant marginal cost, c. Table 1 Firm 1 Firm 2 9 20 9 = 15 0 = 20 215 1,200-20c, 1,200 - 200 975 - 150 1,300 - 200 1,300 - 20c,975 - 150 1,050 - 15c 1,050 - 150 According to a published report, the market quantity Q = 40 corresponds to a duopoly Industry and Q = 30 to a monopoly, a) (2 pts.) Calculate the range of values for the marginal cost c (if any), for which (41 = 20,92 = 20) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Show ALL STEPS. b) (2 pts.) Calculate the range of values for the marginal cost c (if any), for which (91 = 15.42 = 15) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Show ALL STEPS. c) (2 pts.) Calculate the range of values for the marginal cost c, for which a cartel is a preferrable outcome to a duopoly for each firm. d) (2 pts.) Briefly explain why a cartel might generate more profit for each firm but not be chosen by either of them. I e) (2 pts.) Suppose that the marginal cost c equals 40 and the deadweight loss reduction from leaving the cartel is 250. Calculate the average cost reduction required for a regulator to approve the horizontal merger. n (2 pts.) Briefly explain how you would use the information from Table 1 to determine whether firm 1 has an incentive to leave the cartel in the context of the dynamic Cournot model. The payoffs remain unchanged in each period. B) (2 pts.) Suppose that the marginal cost c equals 40. Calculate the value for the discount factor, for which a firm would leave the cartel 2 As an analyst at the Competition Bureau, you are tasked to determine under what conditions a cartel would be sustained in a duopoly industry. Each firm could produce two levels of output, = 15 and 91 = 20, for i = (1,2). The payoffs, representing each firm's profit, for each of the two firms are reported in Table 1 as a function of the constant marginal cost, c. Table 1 Firm 1 Firm 2 9 20 9 = 15 0 = 20 215 1,200-20c, 1,200 - 200 975 - 150 1,300 - 200 1,300 - 20c,975 - 150 1,050 - 15c 1,050 - 150 According to a published report, the market quantity Q = 40 corresponds to a duopoly Industry and Q = 30 to a monopoly, a) (2 pts.) Calculate the range of values for the marginal cost c (if any), for which (41 = 20,92 = 20) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Show ALL STEPS. b) (2 pts.) Calculate the range of values for the marginal cost c (if any), for which (91 = 15.42 = 15) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Show ALL STEPS. c) (2 pts.) Calculate the range of values for the marginal cost c, for which a cartel is a preferrable outcome to a duopoly for each firm. d) (2 pts.) Briefly explain why a cartel might generate more profit for each firm but not be chosen by either of them. I e) (2 pts.) Suppose that the marginal cost c equals 40 and the deadweight loss reduction from leaving the cartel is 250. Calculate the average cost reduction required for a regulator to approve the horizontal merger. n (2 pts.) Briefly explain how you would use the information from Table 1 to determine whether firm 1 has an incentive to leave the cartel in the context of the dynamic Cournot model. The payoffs remain unchanged in each period. B) (2 pts.) Suppose that the marginal cost c equals 40. Calculate the value for the discount factor, for which a firm would leave the cartel 2