I need solution to the following problem.Kindly do not copy paste from Chegg as the answer is not correct. Solve it if you can otherwise if you copy paste then I will give a thumbs down. The picture is clear just zoom it in.

Following is the question

Anika is hired by the owner of a kitchen supply store to manage the store.Anika and the owner are both risk neutral.The probability of weak demand is 0.2and the probability of strong demand is 0.8.Each cell in the following table shows the stores profit from a specific combination of demand and Anikas managerial effort..Anikas cost of effort is not subtracted from these profits.This effort cost is 2 for low effort, 10 for medium and 32 for high.

Weak demand. Strong demand

Low effort. 40. 60

Medium effort. 60. 100

Low effort 100. 140

Create a spreadsheet containing this information.Add a column showing Anikas cost of effort and also add columns for the expected payoff to Anika and the owner.

A:Fill in the expected payoffs to both parties if Anika is compensated for a profit sharing contract providing her with a 50% profit. And the owner gets the other 50%.Which effort level does Anika choose

B:Now suppose that Anikas contract provides her with a base salary 30 and 100% of any profits exceeding 100.Which effort level does she choose?

C:

Which of the two contracts in part a and b will Anika prefer?Which could the owner prefer?

Already updated.

this is the sceeenshot.I hope it is clear now.

IL-A Managerial problem 11 and the reachery or to manager Anha and there we both. They of weak demand is and the probability of serong demand achie show the profit from specification of demand and manager fort. Anton affort and from the profits. The world for low or 10mm and his Weak Demand Strong Demand 25 100 100 C bon contando con Free Economic Whether your pro 100 White LW DAWA Anika is hired by the owner of a kitchen supply store to manage the store.Anika and the owner are both risk neutral.The probability of weak demand is 0.2and the probability of strong demand is 0.8.Each cell in the following table shows the stores profit from a specific combination of demand and Anika's managerial effort..Anika's cost of effort is not subtracted from these profits. This effort cost is 2 for low effort, 10 for medium and 32 for high. Low effort. Medium effort. Low effort Weak demand. 40. 60. 100. Strong demand 60 100 140 Create a spreadsheet containing this information.Add a column showing Anika's cost of effort and also add columns for the expected payoff to Anika and the owner. A:Fill in the expected payoffs to both parties if Anika is compensated for a profit sharing contract providing her with a 50% profit. And the owner gets the other 50%. Which effort level does Anika choose B:Now suppose that Anika's contract provides her with a base salary 30 and 100% of any profits exceeding 100.Which effort level does she choose? C: Which of the two contracts in part a and b will Anika prefer?Which could the owner prefer? IL-A Managerial problem 11 and the reachery or to manager Anha and there we both. They of weak demand is and the probability of serong demand achie show the profit from specification of demand and manager fort. Anton affort and from the profits. The world for low or 10mm and his Weak Demand Strong Demand 25 100 100 C bon contando con Free Economic Whether your pro 100 White LW DAWA Anika is hired by the owner of a kitchen supply store to manage the store.Anika and the owner are both risk neutral.The probability of weak demand is 0.2and the probability of strong demand is 0.8.Each cell in the following table shows the stores profit from a specific combination of demand and Anika's managerial effort..Anika's cost of effort is not subtracted from these profits. This effort cost is 2 for low effort, 10 for medium and 32 for high. Low effort. Medium effort. Low effort Weak demand. 40. 60. 100. Strong demand 60 100 140 Create a spreadsheet containing this information.Add a column showing Anika's cost of effort and also add columns for the expected payoff to Anika and the owner. A:Fill in the expected payoffs to both parties if Anika is compensated for a profit sharing contract providing her with a 50% profit. And the owner gets the other 50%. Which effort level does Anika choose B:Now suppose that Anika's contract provides her with a base salary 30 and 100% of any profits exceeding 100.Which effort level does she choose? C: Which of the two contracts in part a and b will Anika prefer?Which could the owner prefer