I need some help with these problems, thank you so much!

Text Question 3.1 55 Question Help a Ricardo owns a small gift shop on the pier in a popular summer vacation town. Q The owner of the pier approaches Ricardo with an offer that would grant him exclusive rights to operate a gift shop on the pier in exchange for $160,000. If Q entry does not occur, Ricardo would earn $400,000 in prot. Enter With entry, his prot in a duopoly would be $280,000. The xed cost to another (230480) I3 rm from building a new gift shop is $60,000. Assume for simplicity the game tree is illustrated in the gure (in thousands). What 4000 is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium? ( ) Don't enter The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is for the incumbent to V . If the incumbent does not pay, then the rival should E . (240,160)