I will attach my question.

'2. Consider the following simultaneous-move game 1with incomplete information. Player '2 A E Playerl A [ET915} 3 The players do not observe the state T directly1 and there is a common belief that the state is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [13,20]. Before the players choose their actions simultaneously, each player i = 1,2 receives a private signal si about the state 'r, where the signals are drawn independently from the interval [Td,7'+], with IE} D. {a} Dene pure strategies for both players. Find player 33's posterior belief about the state T after she receives her private signal s.- E [15,'2D 5] Further, for a signal s.- E [JED 15] nd player i's posterior belief about the signal sj of the other player. men calculating the posterior beliefs, use the Bayes rule. {b} Show that for If *1: 5f? there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where each player IL chooses the action A if s; weakly emeds \"15, and chooses the action 3 otherwise [hint: check if there are instances at 1which one of the actions beoonies dominant]