If i could get help on all three it would be greatly appreciated. They are all connected and i'm a bit confused. What exactly is missing?

(4) (Textbook problem 5.4) In this game, each of two players can volunteer some of their spare time planting and cleaning up the cornmunity garden. They both like a nicer garden and the garden is nicer if they volunteer more time to work on it. However, each would rather that the other person do the volunteering. Suppose that each player can volunteer O,1,2,3,or4 hours. If player 1 volunteers m hours and 2 volunteers 3; hours, then the resultant garden gives each of them a utility payoff equal to m. Each player also gets disutility from the work involved in gardening. Suppose that player 1 gets a disutility equal to w (and player 2 likewise gets a disutility equal to 3;). Hence, the total utility (payoff) of player 1 is H1(a:,y) = a: + ycc, and that of player 2 is 112(13, y) = 1/3: + yy. Write down the best response set of each player to every strategy of the other players 1. (5) (Textbook problem 5.5) Determine the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game in ex- ercise (4). (6) (Textbook problem 5.6) Consider again the situation of strategic interaction in problem (4) Suppose that an outside observer asked the following question: How much total time should be volunteered in order to make the sum of their utilities the highest? How would you answer this observer