In a congested service facility, users have to wait in a queue for service.

Consider a static queue $($in that there will be no more users joining the queue$)$ of $5$ users who differ only in their delay$/$waiting cost per hour $($the cost of waiting in a queue for a hour$).$ Each user $i\text{'}$s delay cost per hour $v_i$ is private information and is assumed to be constant while waiting. Assume that service requirements of all users are identical and without loss of generality we take the service requirement of each user to be one hour. Moreover, each user derives the same amount of benefit from the service and this benefit exceeds each agent's maximal possible delay cost $($when he$/$she is at the end of the queue$).$ How can the VCG mechanism be used in this setting? Do users have incentives to reveal their true waiting costs? Explain.