In a repeated game of Bertrand competition, suppose two firms are playing the grim trigger strategy....

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In a repeated game of Bertrand competition, suppose two firms are playing the grim trigger strategy. They discount future payoffs at . A firm will play the monopoly price and earn 8 every period, so long as the other firm does the same. However, if a firm deviates from playing the monopoly price, the other firm plays the one-shot Bertrand outcome forever. Collusion is a Nash equilibrium if is (less than or equal to/equal to/greater than or equal to) (0/0.5/1/8/16) In a repeated game of Bertrand competition, suppose two firms are playing the grim trigger strategy. They discount future payoffs at . A firm will play the monopoly price and earn 8 every period, so long as the other firm does the same. However, if a firm deviates from playing the monopoly price, the other firm plays the one-shot Bertrand outcome forever. Collusion is a Nash equilibrium if is (less than or equal to/equal to/greater than or equal to) (0/0.5/1/8/16)