In an online tutorial setting, students can opt to activate their webcams (ON) or keep them off (OFF), while the tutor always has hers on. Assume that there are two students in the class, Player 1 and Player 2. If a student chooses ON while the other student opt for OFF, the student turning on the webcam experiences a -2 payoff due to feeling awkward, while the other student receives a payoff of 2 when playing OFF. If no student activates their webcam (both play OFF), both students receive a -1 payoff due to a negative class atmosphere with minimal interaction. However, if both students turn on their webcams (both play ON), there's a 1 payoff for both students for a more engaging class environment. After these choices have been made the payoffs are revealed and the game proceeds to the next period. Specifically, the outcome of the previous tutorial is observed by both students, then they meet again online the following week. Both students have a per-period discount value of delta, where delta is between 0 and 1. Each student adopts a trigger strategy as follows: They start by cooperating (both turns on their webcam) in the first tutorial. Subsequently, they continue to cooperate in any successive tutorial if, and only if that the other student cooperated in all preceding tutorials. However, if one student chooses not to activate their webcam in a tutorial when the other student did, this "hiding" student might free-ride the class discussion without contributing. As a conse