In lecture we saw the Cournot competition model for two firms with the same cost function. Now, we are going to consider asymmetric cost functions. Assume that demand for a good is given by p=abQd (Qd is quantity demanded), and that there are 2 firms competing in quantities. Both have no fixed costs and a constant marginal cost. Firm 1 has a marginal cost c1, and firm 2 has a marginal cost c2. We have that a>c1>c2. Find the reaction functions of firms 1 and 2 in this market: how the optimal quantity produced depends on the quantity produced by the other firm. To verify that you have found the correct reaction functions, compute the optimal q1 if q2=100, a=4, b=0.01, c1=2, and c2=1. (Note that this is not necessarily an equilibrium.)