in this scenario, what is the difference between separated and pooling equlibria?

(3,0) (4,2) (4,3) (0,0) F B F LL. 2 hg ho 2 U U Nature h 1 h 1 L 12 R 12 1 D D 2 h hat2 F B F B (1,3) (2, 2) (0,0) (5, 1) (a) (5 points) Are there any types of player 1 whose action choice is independent of player 2's behavior? Be specific and justify your answer. (b) (9 points) Are there any separating equilibria in pure strategies? Be explicit about strategies and beliefs, and verify all sequential rationality conditions. (c) (12 points) Are there any pooling equilibria in pure strategies? Be explicit about strategies and beliefs, and verify all sequential rationality conditions