In Zablocki, the state asserted two interests served by the statute. First, the permission-to-marry court proceeding furnished the state with an opportunity to counsel the marriage applicant as to the necessity of fulfilling prior support obligations. Second, the state had an interest in protecting the welfare of out-of-custody children. The Court assumed that these interests met the applicable standard, but held that the means selected by the state to achieve these interests failed the standard. Given this holding, which statement could be expected not to be (and was not) part of the Court's reasoning in Zablocki? Even assuming that counseling does take place, this interest cannot support the withholding of permission to marry once counseling is completed. Marriage counseling is an excellent recommendation for any person entering into marriage, especially a person who has a previous relationship which resulted in offspring. There is the possibility that the marriage will improve a person's financial situation, when a spouse contributes money from a job or otherwise, increasing the ability to fulfill child support obligations. Preventing a person from marrying may not prevent child support obligations to future children, but only child support obligations to future legitimate children