Question: it's a multiple choice with the explanation answer like A or B or C or D it's a multiple choice you can answer more than

it's a multiple choice with the explanation answer like A or B or C or D
it's a multiple choice with the explanation
it's a multiple choice you can answer more than one choice . three choice or four or two or whateve
it's not supposed to be one choice
it's a multiple choice with the explanation
it's a multiple choice with the explanation
it's a multiple choice with the explanation
it's a multiple choice with the explanation
it's a multiple choice with the explanation
it's a multiple choice with the explanation
Question 1.b. What strategies are dominated in this game? Kristin selects Lavender. Larissa selects Yellow. Julie selects Black. There are no dominated strategies. Problem statement for Questions 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.: Three friends (Julie, Kristin and Larissa) independently go shopping for dresses for their high school prom. On reaching the store, each girl sees only three dresses worth considering: one black, one lavender, and one yellow. Each girl furthermore can tell that her two friends would consider the same set of three dresses because all three have somewhat similar tastes. Each girl would prefer to have a unique dress, so a girl's utility is O if she ends up purchasing the same dress as at least one of her friends. All three know that Julie strongly prefers black to both lavender and yellow, so she would get a utility of 3 if she were the only one wearing the black dress, and a utility of 1 if she were either the only one wearing the lavender dress or the only one wearing the yellow dress. Similarly, all know that Kristin prefers lavender and secondarily prefers yellow, so her utility would be 3 for uniquely wearing lavender, 2 for uni ely wearing yellow, and 1 for uniquely wearing black. Finally, all know that Larissa prefers yellow and secondarily prefers black, so she would get 3 for uniquely wearing yellow, 2 for uniquely wearing black, and 1 for uniquely wearing lavender. The following game table describes this three-player game, where Julie is the row player, Kristin is the column player, and Larissa is the table player. Larissa Julie Larissa Julie Black Black Lavender Yellow Lavender Black Lavender Yellow Kristin Black X1 1, 0, 0 1, 0, 0 Kristin Black 0, 0, 1 0, 1, 0 1, 1, 1 Lavender X2 0, 0, 2 1, 3, 2 Lavender X4 0, 0, 0 X5 Yellow X3 1, 2, 2 X7 Yellow 3, 2, 1 0, 2,0 X6 Kristin Larissa Black Lavender Yellow Black 0, 0, 3 3, 3, 3 3, 0, 0 Julie Lavender 1, 1, 3 0, 0, 3 1, 0, 0 Yellow 0, 1, 0 0, 3,0 0, 0, 0 Question 1.a. Based on the description of this game, what payoffs should go where X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, and X7 are on the table above? X1 [Choose ] X2 [Choose ] Yellow Question 1.a. Based on the description of this game, what payoffs should go where X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, and X7 are on the table above? X1 [Choose ] 1, 0, 0 0, 2,0 X2 0, 0, 1 3,0,0 0,3,0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 2 X3 X4 [Choose ] X5 [Choose] X6 [Choose] X7 [Choose ] Question 1.b. What strategies are dominated in this game? Kristin selects Lavender. Larissa selects Yellow. Julie selects Black. There are no dominated strategies. Question 1.c. What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this game? The notation below follows this structure: (Julie's selection, Kristin's selec Larissa's selection) (Yellow, Yellow, Yellow) (Yellow, Lavender, Black) (Lavender, Lavender, Lavender) (Yellow, Black, Lavender) (Black, Lavender, Yellow) (Yellow, Lavender, Yellow) (Black, Yellow, Lavender) (Black, Black, Black) (Lavender, Black, Yellow) O(Lavender, Yellow, Black) Question 1.b. What strategies are dominated in this game? Kristin selects Lavender. Larissa selects Yellow. Julie selects Black. There are no dominated strategies. Problem statement for Questions 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.: Three friends (Julie, Kristin and Larissa) independently go shopping for dresses for their high school prom. On reaching the store, each girl sees only three dresses worth considering: one black, one lavender, and one yellow. Each girl furthermore can tell that her two friends would consider the same set of three dresses because all three have somewhat similar tastes. Each girl would prefer to have a unique dress, so a girl's utility is O if she ends up purchasing the same dress as at least one of her friends. All three know that Julie strongly prefers black to both lavender and yellow, so she would get a utility of 3 if she were the only one wearing the black dress, and a utility of 1 if she were either the only one wearing the lavender dress or the only one wearing the yellow dress. Similarly, all know that Kristin prefers lavender and secondarily prefers yellow, so her utility would be 3 for uniquely wearing lavender, 2 for uni ely wearing yellow, and 1 for uniquely wearing black. Finally, all know that Larissa prefers yellow and secondarily prefers black, so she would get 3 for uniquely wearing yellow, 2 for uniquely wearing black, and 1 for uniquely wearing lavender. The following game table describes this three-player game, where Julie is the row player, Kristin is the column player, and Larissa is the table player. Larissa Julie Larissa Julie Black Black Lavender Yellow Lavender Black Lavender Yellow Kristin Black X1 1, 0, 0 1, 0, 0 Kristin Black 0, 0, 1 0, 1, 0 1, 1, 1 Lavender X2 0, 0, 2 1, 3, 2 Lavender X4 0, 0, 0 X5 Yellow X3 1, 2, 2 X7 Yellow 3, 2, 1 0, 2,0 X6 Kristin Larissa Black Lavender Yellow Black 0, 0, 3 3, 3, 3 3, 0, 0 Julie Lavender 1, 1, 3 0, 0, 3 1, 0, 0 Yellow 0, 1, 0 0, 3,0 0, 0, 0 Question 1.a. Based on the description of this game, what payoffs should go where X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, and X7 are on the table above? X1 [Choose ] X2 [Choose ] Yellow Question 1.a. Based on the description of this game, what payoffs should go where X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, and X7 are on the table above? X1 [Choose ] 1, 0, 0 0, 2,0 X2 0, 0, 1 3,0,0 0,3,0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 2 X3 X4 [Choose ] X5 [Choose] X6 [Choose] X7 [Choose ] Question 1.b. What strategies are dominated in this game? Kristin selects Lavender. Larissa selects Yellow. Julie selects Black. There are no dominated strategies. Question 1.c. What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this game? The notation below follows this structure: (Julie's selection, Kristin's selec Larissa's selection) (Yellow, Yellow, Yellow) (Yellow, Lavender, Black) (Lavender, Lavender, Lavender) (Yellow, Black, Lavender) (Black, Lavender, Yellow) (Yellow, Lavender, Yellow) (Black, Yellow, Lavender) (Black, Black, Black) (Lavender, Black, Yellow) O(Lavender, Yellow, Black)

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