Just part D please .. and please right the info out in detail please!! thank you!!

Here is part A-C if you need it for part d!

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4) Question 6.6 from Tadelis (2013): Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably. Each firm has three possible choices, as it must decide whether or not to exit the industry immediately, at the end of this quarter, or at the end of the next quarter. If a firm chooses to exit then its payoff is from that point forward. Each quarter that both firms operate yields a payoff of 2. For example if firm 1 plans to exit at the end of this quarter while firm 2 plans to exit at the end of the next quarter then the payoffs are (-1.1) because both firms lose-1 in the first quarter and firm 2 gains 2 in the second. The payoff for each firm is the sum of its quarterly profits. A) Write down this game in matrix form B) Are there any strictly dominated strategies? Are there any weakly dominated strategies? C) Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. D) Find the unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. (Hint: you can use your answer in (b) to make things easier.) 4.) EzExit immediate, To Exit this quotes, N= exit nose quater T N Firm/1: 0 E E E 0,0 10,2 6,4 2 T2,0 1-1, 1-1,1 N4,0 1,1 12,21 46.) - There are No Strictly dominated Strategys. - T is a weakly Dominated Strategy. 4.) Firm 2: N E 0,0 10,4 Firm 1: N 120 12,2 -Cross "Tout ble it's weally dominated a wont be picked - The two pure strategy Nash Equilibra is a (EN) & (NE) Both would not deviate from these Stats