Question: Let the bidding function b I I (x ) = x define a symmetric equilibrium of the second price auction. Derive the value of .

Let the bidding function b I I (x ) = x define a symmetric equilibrium of the second price auction. Derive the value of . To help you out, you are advised to structure your answer in accordance with the following format: Fixing her opponent's strategy, express the expected payoff for one player when she has received signal x and bids as if she has received signal y

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